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CASENOTE
New Per Se Taking Rule Short Circuits Cable Television Installations in New York:
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corporation' — The fifth amendment provides
in part that private property shall not be taken by government for public use without just
compensation. 2 This proscription is applicable to the states through the fourteenth
amendment. 3 The government does, however, have the power to regulate private prop-
erty, without compensation to the owner, to protect the health, safety or general welfare of
the public.' Today this power to regulate private property, known as the police power,
often is challenged as violating the fifth and fourteenth amendments' prohibition against.
uncompensated taking of private property for public uses At some point a land use
regulation may become so burdensome that it constitutes a taking of property. 6 If it is
determined that a regulation constitutes a taking, the government must exercise its power
of eminent domain and compensate the landowner in order to pursue its program!
The point at which permissible police power regulation ends and compensable taking
begins, however, has never been clearly established or defined." judicial attempts to
determine the specific point have produced no set formulae or methods. 9 Instead the
Court had developed different and often conflicting theories without overruling old
theories.'° Precedent still exists which holds that a mere regulation of land use, short of a
physical appropriation, can never be a taking." In more recent cases, however, the Court
has held that excessive land use regulation alone may constitute a taking even absent any
physical appropriation of private property.' 2 Moreover, the Court still cites both lines of
precedent.' 3
' Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
2 U.S. CONST. amend. V, "No person shall ... he deprived of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation." Id.
3 Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 238-39 (1897).
▪ See Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 125-27 (1978).
5 See, e.g., id. (no taking found); Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962) (no
taking found); United States v. Central Eureka Mining Co., 357 U.S. 155 (1958) (no taking found);
United States v. Caltex, Inc., 344 U.S. 149 (1952) (no taking found); Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272
(1928) (no taking found); Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922) (taking found);
Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915) (no taking found).
6 Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922). "The general rule at least is, that
while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as
a taking." Id.
• Id. at 413.
• See Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 123-24 (1978); Goldblatt v.
Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594 (1961).
• See cases cited supra note 8.
1 " Compare Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 668-69 (1887) with Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahan,
260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922). In Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 668-69 (1887) the Court held that a
regulation which merely restricted the use of property could never be deemed a taking. Id. In
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922), however, the Court invalidated a
regulation prohibiting the mining of coal. Id. While not explicitly overruling Mugler, the Court stated
that the general rule was that regulation which goes "too far" will be deemed a taking. Id.
" Sanguinetti v, United States, 264 U.S. 146, 149 (1924); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623,
668-69 (1887); Transportation Co. v. Chicago, 99 U.S. 635, 642 (1878).
's 	 e.g., United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 378 (1945); Pennsylvania Coal
Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
' 3 See Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 126-28 (1978) (citing both
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Nevertheless, the Supreme Court recently has been consistent in its approach to
taking disputes. The Court has used an ad hoc balancing process in recent cases, holding
that the circumstances of the particular case will determine whether a taking has oc-
curred." While the Court has not articulated a set method of analysis, its inquiry has not
been standardiess.' 5
 The Court weighs the public interest or benefit served by the
regulation's against such factors as the character of the government action," the eco-
nomic impact of the regulation on the property owner,' " and the regulation's interference
with the owner's reasonable investment-backing expectations." If the public interest is
strong and is not outweighed by the impact of the regulation, the Court generally has
upheld the regulation."
In employing this balancing process in recent cases, the Court did not distinguish
between regulations which did or did not require a permanent physical invasion of
private property." In the recent Supreme Court case of Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan
CATV Corp., 22
 however, the Court held that the balancing process did not apply to
regulations which caused a permanent physical occupation of private property 2 3
 Rather
the Court held that a regulation which required a permanent physical occupation of
private property was a taking per se, without regard to other factors." Loretto effectively
limited the use of the multi-factor balancing process to taking disputes which involve
temporary physical invasions of property or non-possessory use regulations, while affirm-
ing a per se rule for those disputes which require any type of permanent physical
occupations. 25
Jean Loretto, the plaintiff in Loretto, was a New York City apartment building owner
who discovered that Teleprompter Corporation and Teleprompter Manhattan CATV
("Teleprompter") had physically bolted cables and equipment to the roof of her build-
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922) and Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887));
Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 593-94 (1962) (citing both Pennsylvania Coal Co. v.
Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922) and Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887)); see also Sax, Takings and the
Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36, 42-46 (1964) (noting that the Court still cites both Justices Harlan and
Holmes authoritatively, although they espoused conflicting theories).
14 See PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 82.83 (1980); Kaiser Aetna v. United
States, 444 U.S. 164, 175 (1979); Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124
(1978).
19 Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 426 (1982).
See Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124-27 (1978); Goldblatt v.
Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594-95 (1962); Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393,
413.16 (1922).
17
 PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 83 (1980); Kaiser Aetna v. United
States; 444 U.S. 164, 175 (1979); Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124
(1978).
' 8 See cases cited supra note 17. See also Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413
(1922) ("One fact for consideration . . . is the extent of the diminution.").
'° See cases cited supra note 17.
20 See, e.g., Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 134 (1978) (New York
Landmarks Law upheld due to the public interest in the preservation of historic landmarks);
Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594-96 (1962) (Town ordinance prohibiting
excavation below the water table upheld as presumably valid safety measure in absence of evidence
that ordinance had unreasonably harsh impact on claimant).
" See cases cited supra note 17.
" 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
23 Id. at 426.
24 Id.
" Id.
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ing.26 The installations consisted of approximately thirty feet of cable and several small
metal directional taps." The plaintiff did not discover the existence of Teleprompter's
facilities until after her purchase of the building." At that time, Teleprompter dropped a
visible subcable down the front of her building to provide cable service to a first floor
tenant."
The initial installation of cables and directional taps was made pursuant to an
agreement between Loretto's predecessor in title and Teleprompter, and prior to Loretto's
purchase of the buildine" In making the subsequent cable installation, however, Tele-
prompter also relied on the authority of New York Executive Law Section 828. 3 ' Section
828 barred landlords from interfering with the installation of cable television facilities on
their property." The statute only required that the companying pay for the installation,
maintenance and removal of the facilities, indemnify the owner for any damages caused
by the equipment, and pay the owner a set lee for the use of his or her property." The fee
at the time of Teleprompter's installation of the subcable had been set by the Commission
on Cable Television at a one-time one dollar payment.'" Under the statute a landlord-
owner was prohibited from denying the cable television company access to the property
or from demanding any payment in excess of the set fee, from either the company or the
subscribing tenants.35
Upon discovery the subcahle, the roof cables and equipment, Loretto initiated a class
action suit" against Teleprompter for damages and injunctive relief." She alleged that
28 Id. at 421-25.
27 Id. at 422 (quoting Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 53 N.Y.2d 124, 135,
440 N.Y.S.2d 843, 847, 423 N.E.2d 320, 324 (1981)).
28 Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 53 N.V.2d 124, 135, 440 N.Y.S.2d 843,
847, 423 N.E.2d 320, 324 (1981).
29 458 U.S. at 422.
a° Id. at 421.
31 See infra note 32.
32 N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 828 provides in pertinent part:
1. No landlord shall
a. interfere with the installation of cable television facilities upon his property or
premises, except that a landlord may require:
i. that the installation of cable television facilities conform to such reasonable
conditions as are necessary to protect the safety, functioning and appearance
of the premises, and the convenience and well-being of other tenants;
ii. that the cable television company or the tenant or a combination thereof bear
the entire cost of the installation, operation or removal of such facilities; and
iii. that the cable television company agree to indemnify the landlord for any
damage caused by the installation, operation or removal of such facilities.
b. Demand or accept payment from any tenant, in any form, in exchange for
permitting cable television service on or within his property or premises, or from
any cable television company in exchange therefor in excess of any amount which
the commission shall, by regulation, determine to be reasonable; or
c. discriminate in rental charges, or otherwise, between tenants who receive cable
television and those who do not.
Id.
33 Id.
34 458 U.S. at 423 - 24.
35 N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 828 (McKinney 1982). For the language of the statute, see .supra note 32.
36 458 U.S. at 424. Class action status was granted for all owners of real property in the state on
which Teleprompter had placed its equipment, with the exclusion of single family dwellings. Id. at
424 n.4. Notice to the class was postponed by stipulation. Id.
37 Id. at 424.
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the presence of Teleprompter's equipment on her property constituted a trespass, and
insofar as Teleprompter relied on the authority of section 828, an unconstitutional
taking of property without just compensation as proscribed by the fifth and fourteenth
amendments.38 Loretto sought a determination that the grant of a statutory license to
permanently occupy private property under section 828 was an invalid exercise of state
police power." New York City, which had granted Teleprompter an exclusive franchise
to provide cable television service within areas of Manhattan, intervened on behalf of
Teleprompter. 40
The Supreme Court of New York, Special Term, upheld the constitutionality of
Section 828 and granted summary judgment to Teleprompter and New York City.'" The
Appellate Division affirmed without opinion.'" The New York Court of Appeals also
upheld the statute" with only one justice dissenting." The Court of Appeals rejected
plaintiff's argument that a physical occupation of private property authorized by govern-
ment was necessarily and automatically a taking." Instead, the Court of Appeals analyzed
the dispute by balancing the private and social interests involved to find that the statute
was a valid exercise of the state's police power." It determined that the public interest in
the promotion and availability of an important. educational and communications medium
outweighed the negligible invasion of the plaintiff's private property. 47 The United States
Supreme Court reversed the New York Court of Appeals, holding that the presence of
Teleprompter's equipment on Iftretto's building was a permanent physical occupation
authorized by government, and therefore constituted a taking."
The Loretto decision is noteworthy for its introduction of an express per se rule in an
area previously devoid of "rigid rules" or "set formulae."'" Precedent and traditional
ideas of property indicated to the Loretto Court that permanent physical occupations of
property by government automatically constituted a taking without regard to factors of
public interest or economic impact . 5°
This casenote assesses the soundness and potential impact of Loretto's rule that all
permanent physical occupations are takings regardless of public interest or economic
impact. First, the history of takings clause jurisprudence is discussed briefly." This
28 Id.
as Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 53 N.Y.2d 124, 138, 440 N.Y.S.2d 843,
849, 423 N.E.2d 320. 326 (1981).
40 458 U.S. at 424.
41
 Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 98 Misc. 2d 944, 415 N.Y.S.2d 180 (Sup.
Ct., 1979).
42
 Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 73 A.D.2d 849, 222 N.Y.S.2d 550 (App.
Div., 1979).
42
 Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 53 N.Y.2d 124, 155, 440 N.Y.S.2d 843,
859, 423 N.E.2d 336 (1981).
" Id. at 156-63, 440 N.Y.S.2d at 859-64, 423 N.E.2d at 336-41 (Cooke, C.J., dissenting).
42. Id. at 145-46, 440 N.Y.S.2d at 853, 423 N.E.2d at 330.
4 " Id. at 154-55, 440 N.Y.S.2d at 859, 423 N.E.2d at 336.
42 Id.
4'
 458 U.S. at 438. "Teleprompter's cable installation on appellant's building constitutes a taking
under the traditional test. The installation involved a direct physical attachment of plates, boxes,
wires, bolts and screws to the building, completely occupying space immediately above and upon the
roof and along the building's exterior wall." Id. (footnote omitted).
49 See supra notes 8-20 and accompanying text.
" 438 U.S. at 434.
51 See infra notes 59-165 and accompanying text.
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discussion includes an examination of the various tests developed and employed by the
Supreme Court in takings decisions. Second, Loretto's rationale and justification for the per
se rule is set forth in detail S 2 Third, that rationale is analyzed in light of recent Supreme
Court precedent and the purpose of the taking clause." I t is submitted that Loretto's per se
rule is inconsistent with the modern trend toward the use of a balancing test for the
resolution of all takings disputes." The Court's contention that a permanent physical
occupation of property is qualitatively more harmful to property rights, and that a per se
rule is required to protect those rights, is also challenged." Fourth, the potential impact
of the per se rule is explored by examining its possible effect on subdivision exactions,
specialized land use regulations which require uncompensated permanent physical occu-
pations of private property by the public. 5 ° It is suggested that the per se rule may require
the invalidation of these useful and important regulations." In conclusion it is proposed
that the Loretto Court should have avoided the affirmation of the per se rule and instead
employed the multifactor balancing test." Such an approach would not only have pre-
served the cable television regulation in Loretto, but also would have avoided the unneces-
sary creation of a rigid rule with far-reaching and detrimental potential.
I. TAKING CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE
Taking clause jurisprudence has been called a "crazy-quilt pattern of Supreme Court
doctrine." 59 In its struggle to differentiate compensable takings under the fifth and
fourteenth amendments from valid and therefore noncompensable police power regula-
tions, the Court has failed to establish any one test or rule." Instead it developed and
employed different rationales at different times, and sometimes several at once." There
seem to be at least three general theories, however, which the Court has used most often
and which it still uses to varying degrees. These theories are the physical invasion theory,
the diminution in value theory and the multifactor balancing process."
A. Physical Invasion
Early decisions distinguished takings from non-takings on the basis of the presence
or absence of a physical invasion of private property by government which caused an
ouster of the owner." The physical invasion, moreover, was usually a permanent invasion
52 See infra notes 166-252 and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 265-345 and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 266-307 and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 308.345 and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 346-905 and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 400.05 and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 406-14 and accompanying text.
" Dunham, Griggs a. Allegheny County in Perspective: Thirty Years of Supreme Court Expropriation
Law, 1962 Sup. Or. REV. 63.
6° See supra notes 8-20 and accompanying text. For additional discussions of the Court's failure
to establish a taking test, see Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical
Foundations of 'Just Compensation" Law, 80 HAM'. L. REV. 1165 (1967); Sax, supra note 13.
61 Sax, supra note 13, at 46. "A survey of the recent cases, . . . leaves the impression that the
Court has settled upon no satisfactory rationale for the cases and operates somewhat haphazardly,
using any or all of the available, often conflicting theories without developing any clear approach to
the constitutional problem." Id.
" See Michelman, supra note 60, and Sax, supra note 13.
6° Compare, e.g., United States v. Lynah, 188 U.S. 445, 469 (1902) (taking found when govern-
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such that the owner was effectively separated from his property and not merely temporar-
ily prohibited from using it.." I f the government's action merely damaged or impaired the
use of private property it did not constitute a taking." To constitute a taking, the
government action had to he a permanent invasion of the land, amounting to an appro-
priation of the land and not merely an injury to the land. 66
The Court developed this physical invasion test in late-nineteenth—early-twentieth
century flooding cases. In those cases, the government was typically sued when the
construction of public dams, locks, or canals caused damage to private property. 67 The
Court. employed the physical invasion test to distinguish compensable from non-
compensable losses." Pursuant to this test, a taking was found when the construction
caused some material such as water, dirt, or sand to be permanently placed on private
property so that the owner's use of the properly was effectively destroyed or impaired."
in contrast, there was no taking when the construction or structure merely limited
accessibility or temporarily impaired the use of private property." Such damages were
deemed consequential and non-compensable since there was no physical invasion causing
an ouster of possession."
ment built dam subjected rice plantation to permanent flooding and rendered property an irre-
claimable bog) and Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 166, 181 (1871) (taking found
when government -authorized dam permanently inundated claimant's land with water causing an
ouster of his possession) with Sanguinetti v, United States, 264 U.S. 146, 149 (1924) (no taking
found when canal authorized by Congress intermittently overflowed, temporarily flooding private
property but not ousting the claimant from his normal use) and Transportation Co. v. Chicago, 99
U.S. 635, 639-42 (1878) (no taking found when temporary city dam impaired claimant's access to and
use of his docks).
° United States v. Lynah, 188 U.S. 445, 469 (1902); Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co. 80 U.S. (13
Wall.) 166, 181 (1871).
65 See, e.g., United States v. Central Eureka Mining Co., 357 U.S. 155, 165 - 66 (1958) (no taking
when government merely prohibited operation of non -essential gold mines in war time); Mugler v.
Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 654, 668 -69 (1887) (no taking when state law merely prohibited use of land as
brewery business); see also Sanguinetti v. United States, 264 U.S. 116, 149 (1924) (temporary
flooding held not a taking); Transportation Co. v. Chicago, 99 U.S. 635, 639-42 (1878) (temporary
impairment of dock and access held not a taking).
" United States v. Lynah, 188 U.S. 445, 469- 70 (1902); Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 80 U.S. (13
Wall.) 166, 180-81 (1871).
67
	e.g., Pumpelly v. Green Bay' Co. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 166, 167 (1871) (government-
authorized (lam caused permanein flooding of private property); Sanguinetti v. United States, 264
U.S. 146, 147 (1924) (canal authorized by Congress intermittently overflowed, flooding private
property); United States v. Cress, 243 U.S. 316, 318 (1917) (government-built dam and lock raised
level of river above its normal level subjecting land to frequent flooding).
6e
	v. United States, 264 U.S. 146, 149 (1924) "Wit order to create an enforceable
liability against the Government, it is, at least, necessary that the (government action) ... constitute an
actual, permanent invasion of the land, amounting to an appropriation of and not merely an injury
to the property. - Id.; see also United States v. Cress, 243 U.S. 316, 327-38 (1917) (frequent flooding of
land held a taking); Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 166, 181 (1871) (permanent
flooding held a taking).
" See, e.g., United States v. Gress, 243 U.S. 316, 328 (1917); United States v. Lynah, 188 U.S.
445, 474 (1902); Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 166, 181 (1871).
7° See, e.g., Gibson v. United States, 166 U.S. 269, 275-76 (1897) (no taking found when
construction of dike interfered with plaintiff's access to her shipping docks); Transportation Co. v.
Chicago, 99 U.S. 635, 639, 643 (1878) (no taking found when construction of dam temporarily
interfered with plaintiff's use of his land).
" Gibson v. United States, 166 U.S. 269, 275.76 (1897); Transportation Co. v. Chicago, 99 U.S.
635, 643-45 (1878).
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The distinction between takings and non-takings based on the presence or absence of
physical occupation of private property causing an ouster of possession is also apparent in
another line of cases. These cases involved disputes over repeated rather than permanent
interferences with private property." In United Slates v. Causby" and Griggs v. Allegheny
County, 74 for example, the Court emphasized that the low-level military flights directly
over the claimant's property were tantamount to a physical invasion of the property. 75
According to the Court, any damages caused by the flights resulted from a direct physical
invasion of the claimant's domain." The land was taken, in the Court's view, as com-
pletely as if it were appropriated for runways for the planes."
Given the historical distinction between takings and non-takings based on the pres-
ence or absence of a physical occupation, the Court consistently upheld mere land use
regulations against takings challenges." According to the Court, a regulation or prohibi-
tion of a certain use of land, especially a use deemed harmful to the public, was never a
taking absent a physical invasion causing an ouster of possession." Consequently, the
Court upheld many use regulations that substantially destroyed or impaired the value and
use of private property, but did not involve a physical invasion or "ouster." For instance,
the Court upheld regulations which prevented the pursuit of certain businesses on private
property even though the regulations rendered the property virtually worthless. 8° In
such cases, the Court rejected the argument that to prohibit any valuable use of the
property was, in essence, to "take" the property because there was no taking in the
traditional sense of an ouster of possession." The Court reasoned that nothing was
literally or physically taken from the owner; he was merely prevented from using his
property in a certain way." In the Court's view, therefore, there was no taking.
72 See, e.g., Griggs v. Allegheny County, 369, U.S. 84, 88-89 (1962) (frequent overflights held a
taking); United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 264-66 (1946) (repeated military flights directly over
owner's land that destroyed his chicken farm held a taking); Portsmouth Harbor Land Sc Hotel Co. v.
United States, 260 U.S. 327, 329-30 (1922) (repeated firing of United States artillery guns over
claimant's land could be deemed a taking); United States v. Cress, 243 U.S. 316, 328 (1917) (repeated
flooding of land caused by government dam held a taking).
" 328 U.S. 256 (1946).
" 369 U.S. 84 (1962).
" 328 U.S. at 265-66; 369 U.S. at 88-89.
" 328 U.S. at 265-66.
" Id. at 262.
" See, e.g., Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 597-98 (1962) (safety ordinance
prohibiting claimant from continuing a prior established sand and gravel mining business upheld);
United States v. Central Eureka Mining Co., 357 U.S. 155, 156-57 (1958) (government order closing
gold mines to force shill of' skilled miners to essential war-time mining work upheld); Miller v.
Schoene, 276 U.S. 272, 281 (1928) (statute ordering the destruction of valuable cedar trees to
prevent cedar rust from contaminating nearby apple orchads upheld); Walls v. Midland Carbon Co.,
254 U.S. 300, 324-25 (1920) (law prohibiting manufacture of carbon black upheld); Hadacheck v.
Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 412-14 (1915) (law prohibiting operation of a brickyard upheld); Reinman
v. City of Little Rock, 237 U.S. 171, 180 (1915) (law prohibiting operation of livery stable upheld);
Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 674 (1887) (law prohibiting operation of liquor business upheld).
" Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 668-69 (1887).
" See, e.g., Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 405 (1915) (claimant's tract was worth
$800,000 for brick making purposes, but its value decreased to no more than $60,000 after enact-
ment of a local law prohibiting operation of the brick yard); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 668-69
(1887) (claimant's distillery rendered virtually worthless after enactment of a local law prohibiting sale
and manufacture of alcohol).
" Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 666-69 (1887).
64 Id.
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In sum, the physical invasion requirement enabled the Court to uphold many
governmental actions and regulations against taking challenges. 83
 No matter how great the
financial impact of a regulation on an individual, there was no compensable taking absent
an accompanying physical occupation and ouster of possession. Although the Court has
never expressly overruled the physical invasion test, subsequent and conflicting tests used
by the Court make it unclear how much weight this test now carries. In the early twentieth
century, for instance, the Court began to invalidate regulations even in the absence of a
physical occupation of land if the regulation went "too far" and substantially diminished
the value of the property."
B. Diminution in Value
Under their police power, the states have the authority to regulate property with-
out compensating the owner to protect the health, safety and general welfare of the
public." These regulations usually take the form of a prohibition of a certain use of
property!" Under the traditional taking, such police power regulations, without an
accompanying physical occupation of land, were not takings." In the landmark case of
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon," however, Justice Holmes, writing for the Court, intro-
duced the theory that regulation, if it went "too far," could become a taking, even absent a
physical appropriation of the land by the government. 89
Pennsylvania Coal Co. involved a state law which made it commercially impracticable
for a coal company to mine its coal. 9° The Court invalidated the law as an unconstitutional
taking of property without compensation even though the coal was never physically taken
or appropriated by the state." The Court reasoned that to make it impossible to mine the
coal was as much a taking as if the state had appropriated the coal for its own use without
payment. 92
 Justice Holmes suggested that the distinction between a valid police power
regulation and a compensable taking was one of degree rather than form. 83
 Thus, at some
83 See cases cited supra note 78.
" See Pennsylvania Coal Co. v Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
63 Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954). There the Court stated:
An attempt to define [the police power's].reach or trace its outer limits is fruitless.
... The definition is essentially the product of legislative determinations addressed to
the purposes of government, purposes neither abstractly nor historically capable of
complete definition.... Public safety, public health, morality, peace and quiet, law and
order — these are some of the more conspicuous examples of the traditional applica-
tion of the police power to municipal affairs.
Id.
" See, e.g., cases cited supra note 78.
" See supra notes 63-84 and accompanying text.
68
 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
" Id. at 415.
9' Id. at 412-15. The Pennsylvania Coal Co. had sold property to home builders but retained
the title and right to mine any coal located below the surface. Id. at 412-13. When the company
proposed to exercise this right and necessarily cause the collapse of the houses built on the surface,
the legislature passed an emergency measure prohibiting the mining of coal within so many feet of
residential buildings. Id. It was this legislation that the Supreme Court struck down as an unconstitu-
tional taking of private property. Id. at 414-15.
"' Id.
92 Id.
93 Id. at 416.
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point, according to Holmes, a regulation could go "too far" and become a taking." He
suggested that the determination of the point at which a regulation became a taking
depended upon an evaluation of the particular facts of each case.95 In Pennsylvania Coal
Co., Holmes apparently evaluated the facts by weighing the public interest in the regula-
tion against the extent of the "taking" caused by the regulation." In so doing, he
expressly identified the diminution in property value resulting from the regulation as one
important fact in his evaluation." Justice Holmes noted that. when the financial loss
caused by the regulation reached a certain magnitude the enforcement of the law
required an exercise of eminent domain and compensation." Accordingly, the Court. in
Pennsylvania Coal Co. invalidated the Pennsylvania law which did not appropriate, but did
prohibit the mining of certain valuable coal."
Despite the apparent disparity between Pennsylvania Coal Co. and earlier precedent
holding that mere land use regulation was never a taking absent a physical occupation and
ouster,'°° Pennsylvania Coal Co. did not expressly overturn earlier precedent.'m In fact,
the Court still cites both lines of precedent authoritatively, and often in the same case.'"
Consequently, it is unclear how much weight the diminution in value test should be
accorded, especially since still later precedent has indicated that diminution in property
value alone is often insufficient to constitute a taking.'" Nevertheless, the extent of a
regulation's impact on property value is an important factor in the third test used by the
Court, the modern balancing test. 1 °'
C. Balancing Test
As in Pennsylvania Coal Co., the Court in Penn Central Transportation Company v. New
York City"' acknowledged that a regulation of property could become so excessive as to
constitute a taking.'" The Court refused to find, however, that the designation of Grand
Central Station as an historic landmark and the Landmark Preservation Committee's
subsequent veto of a proposed addition to the terminal constituted a taking.'" The Penn
Central Court reiterated Holmes' statement in Pennsylvania Coal Co. that whether a taking
was found would depend on the particular facts of the case.'" The Court in Pennsylvania
94 Id. at 415
" Id. at 413.
95 Id. at 413-14.
97 Id. at 4i3.
9 ' Id.
9° Id. at 414.
'" See supra notes 63-84 and accompanying text.
" 1 The Court merely staled: "We regard this as going beyond any of the cases decided by this
Court." 260 U.S. at 416. For an additional discussion of Pennsylvania Coal Co.'s departure from the
trend, see Sax, supra note 13, at 41.
102 See supra notes 11-13 and accompanying text.
103 Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 131 (1981). There the Court
stated that; "... decisions sustaining ... land use regulations, which, ... are reasonably related to the
promotion of the general welfare, uniformly reject the proposition that diminution in properly
value, standing alone, can establish a 'taking.' " Id. (citations omitted).
1 " See infra notes 112-15 and accompanying text.
1 " 438 U.S. 104. (1978).
'm Id. at 127-28.
107 Id. at 123.
1 " Id. at 124.
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Coal Co. had identified only one factor of particular significance, namely the extent of
regulation's impact on the value of the regulated property,'" The Court in Penn Central,
however, identified three factors of special importance in what it called an "ad hoc factual"
taking inquiry.'" These three factors were: 1) the severity of the economic impact of the
regulation on the claimant; 2) the regulation's interference with the claimant's distinct
investment-backed expectations; and 3) the character of the government action."'
In elaborating on the "economic impact" factor, the Court noted that many govern-
ment regulations had been upheld in the past even though they adversely affected
recognized private property interests.'" The Court suggested that such regulations were
often upheld because a state tribunal had reasonably concluded that the welfare of the
public would be promoted by the regulation. 13 The Court did note that a use regulation
might constitute a "taking" if not reasonably necessary to promote a substantial public
purpose, or if it had "an unduly harsh impact" on the owner's use of his property." 4 A
diminution in property value alone, caused by a regulation reasonably related to the
public welfare, however, could not establish a taking." 5 In those contexts, the Court
focused not on the diminution in property value, but on the alternative uses the regula-
tion still allowed.'"
The second important factor considered by the Penn Central Court was the regula-
tion's effect on the claimant's distinct investment backed expectations." 7 The Court
explained this factor with the example of Pennsylvania Coal Co. According to the Penn
Central Court, Pennsylvania Coal Co. was the leading case standing for the proposition that
a regulation, though it substantially furthered an important public purpose, might so
frustrate an owner's expected return on his investment in property, that it constituted a
taking.'" In Pennsylvania Coal Co., for instance, a coal company had sold its property but
specifically reserved title and mining rights to the underlying coal.'" A subsequent state
law prevented the coal company from exercising these rights and effectively denied the
company access to its coal."° According to the Penn Central Court, that law constituted a
taking because it interfered with the owner's distinct investment-backed expectations in its
property.' 21 The company had expressly reserved title to the coal with the expectation
that it would be able to exercise its property rights and remove the coal at a future date.' 22
According to the Court in both Pennsylvania Coal Co. and Penn Central, to make it
commercially impracticable to mine coal had nearly the same effect as the complete
destruction of property rights and therefore constituted a taking.' 23
In determining when a regulation constituted a taking, the Penn Central Court
examined a third factor, the character of the government action.'" The Court stated that
109 Pennsylvania Coal Co., 260 U.S. at 413.
110 Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124.
Id.
112 Id. at 124-25.
113 Id. at 125.
114 Id. at 127.
1/5 Id. at 131.
118 Id.
IU Id. at 127-28
118 Id. at 127.
119 Pennsylvania Coal Co., 260 U.S. at 412.
120 Id. at 412-13.
Ill Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 127.
122 Pennsylvania Coal Co., 260 U.S. at 412 - 13.
123 Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 127; Pennsylvania Coal Co., 260 U.S. at 414.
124 438 U.S. at 124, 128.
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it was more apt to find a taking when the action could be characterized as a physical
invasion by government rather that as a government program to adjust the benefits and
burdens of economic life to promote the common good.'" The Court implied that the
distinction between the two was that in the first instance, the government was acting in its
"enterprise" capacity to acquire land for a specific government function, such as govern-
ment military air flights. 12 " In the second situation, however, the government was merely
adjusting private interests through programs like zoning laws, such that the common
good was promoted.' 27 It was not appropriating property for a government enterprise;
thus, there was no taking according to the Court in Penn Central."'
The Court employed the multifactor balancing test to analyze the challenged law in
Penn Central."' The case involved a dispute over the addition of an office tower to New
York's Grand Central Terminal.'" Since Grand Central had been declared an historic
landmark under New York City's Landmarks Preservation Law ("Landmarks Law"),'"
the New York City Landmarks Preservation Commission had authority to veto any
proposed structural changes to the building. 132 Pursuant to this authority, the Commis-
sion had rejected the proposed addition to the terminal. The owner, Penn Central, then
contested the Landmarks Law as constituting a taking of its property without compensa-
t ion. 133
In applying the balancing test, the Court weighed the public interest in the preserva-
tion of historic and aesthetic buildings against the character of the government action, the
economic impact of the regulation on Penn Central, and its interference with Penn
Central's investment-backed expectation in Grand Central Station.'" First, the Court
characterized the government action in Penn Central as a program to adjust the benefits
and burdens of economic life such that the common good was promoted)" The govern-
ment, according to the New York City Council, was attempting to preserve historic
buildings for the benefit of all New Yorkers. 136 It was not attempting to appropriate the
space above the claimant's property for its own use as in United States v. Cauchy. 137 Thus, in
the Court's view, the Landmarks Law was more like a zoning law designed to promote the
1 " Id. at 124.
"6 Id. at 135 (citing United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946), as an example of government
acting in its enterprise capacity).
197 Id. at 124, 135.
'" Id. at 135. The Court was apparently adopting a test described in Sax, Takings and the Police
Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36 (1964), in which the author suggested that a taking depended on whether the
government was acting in its enterprise capacity, acquiring resources for its own account; or whether
it was acting as an arbiter, mediating conflicts between competing private economic claims. Id. at
62-63. According to the author, any losses visited upon the individual due to government action of
the first type resulted in a direct benefit to the government and therefore should be a taking. Id. at
63. Losses arising from the government's mediation of private claims produced no benefit to any
governmental enterprise but merely promoted the common good and therefore should not be a
taking. Id. at 62-63.
129 438 U.S. at 123-38.
130 Id. at 115.
131 Id. at 115-16.
139 Id. at 110-12.
133 Id. at 116-22.
"4 Id. at 128-38.
135 Id. at 131-35.
136 Id. at 134.
"T Id. at 135. For a discussion of Causby, see supra notes 73- 77 and accompanying text.
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general welfare than an appropriation of private property for a government purpose.'"
The New York law, according to the Court, merely prevented the owner or anyone else
from occupying certain airspace above its property. 139 The government did not thereby
appropriate the airspace and destroy the use of the property below as in United States v.
Causby."'
Secondly, the Court found that the economic impact of the law on the claimant was
not determinative of a taking. Since a diminution in property value alone did not establish
a taking, the Court focused on the uses that the regulation still permitted.'" The Court
found that the New York City law did not interfere with the claimant's present use of his
building. 142 In fact, the law contemplated that the building would continue to be used as it
had been for the past sixty-five years.' 43 Moreover, with respect to the third factor,
namely the interference with investment-backed expectations, the Court noted that the
law did not prohibit Penn Central's primary expectation that its property would be used
as a train terminal.' 44 Neither did it prohibit absolutely all additions to the terminal, but
only additions not approved by the Commission. 195
 According to the Court, the claimant
might reformulate its plan and seek approval for a smaller structure more in harmony
with the Commission's ideas. 146 The Court concluded that the Landmarks Law did not
constitute a taking."' The restrictions imposed on the claimant's property rights were
substantially related to the promotion of the general welfare in the Court's view, and were
not so severe that they prohibited all reasonable use of the property. 148
The ad hoc balancing process of Penn Central has been employed by the Court in
subsequent cases.'" In one case, PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 15 " the Court found
that a physical invasion of a private shopping mall by solicitors exercising state constitu-
tional rights of free speech and petition did not constitute a taking."' Absent evidence of
a concomitant adverse economic impact, the Court regarded the physical invasion of the
property as not itself determinative of a taking.' 52 In a second case, Kaiser Aetna v. United
States," 3 the Court. found that a governmental attempt to secure a public right of passage
in a navigable channel dredged and owned by a private party did constitute a taking."
According to the Court, the government's action seriously interfered with the claimant's
distinct investment-backed expectations.' 55 The action went far beyond ordinary regula-
1 " 438 U.S. at 135.
"'} Id.
'" Id.
"I Id. at 131.
142 Id. at 136-37.
143 Id.
1" Id. at 136.
145 Id. at 136 - 37.
146 Id. at 137.
"7 Id. at 138.
"" Id.
149
	
e.g., PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 83-84 (1980); Kaiser Aetna v.
United States, 444 U.S. 164, 174-75 (1979).
1 " 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
"I Id. at 83-84.
152 Id.
"3 444 U.S. 164 (1979).
164 Id. at 180.
155 Id. at 179.
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tion "" and amounted to a substantial devaluation of private property.' 67
 The Court.
stated that the claimant's expectation that he would be able to exclude non-paying users
from the channel was a property interest.'" In the Court's view, the government. could
not take that property without providing compensation.'"
In sum, the Court has often recognized that there are no set formulae of rigid rules in
a taking analysis.' 6° Rather, Penn Central and its progeny have shown a trend towards the
,
use of a balancing inquiry in which the Court examines the public interest in the
regulation, the type of regulation and the severity of the regulation's impact."' Although
the Court has observed that a regulation may curtail some use or economic benefit of
private property, the Court has stated that a regulation may not survive a taking challenge
if it serves no reasonable public interest, or if it has an unduly harsh impact on the
claimant.' 62
 The Court has also observed, however, that government could not go on if it
were forced to pay for every new law which affected private property. 18" In the final
analysis, therefore, the resolution of a taking dispute depends ultimately on an exercise of
judgment and an application of logic that promotes justice and fairness,'" Until Loretto,
it appeared that the recent trend of the Court was to base its judgment on an assessment
[W]hat petitioners now have is a body of water that was private property under
Hawaiian law, linked to navigable water by a channel dredged by them with the consent
of the Government. . . . The consent of individual officials representing the United
States ... can lead to the fruition.of a number of expectancies embodied in the concept
of 'property' — expectancies that, if sufficiently important, the Government must
condemn and pay for before it takes over the management of the landowner's prop-
erty.
Id.
See also PruneYard, 447 U.S. at 84, which characterizes the attempt in Kaiser Aetna to create a
public right of access to plaintiffs' improved pond as an interference with plaintiffs' "'reasonable
investment backed expectations.'"Id.
1 " Kaiser Aetna, 444 U.S. at 178. "Here, the Government's attempt to create a public right of
access to the improved pond goes so far beyond ordinary regulation or improvement for navigation
as to amount to a taking under the logic of Pennsylvania Coal Co. 71. Mahan." Id.
1 " Id. at 180.
13 K Id.
'" Id. at 179-80.
16 " Prune Yard Shopping Center v. Robins, 497 U.S. at 75; Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444
U.S. at 175; Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65 (1979) ("There is no abstract or fixed point at which
judicial intervention under the Takings Clause becomes appropriate."); Penn Central Transp. Co. v.
City of New York, 438 U.S. at 124; Coldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594 (1962);
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. at 413 ("the question depends upon the particular facts.").
161 Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 442 (1982) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting). "In sum, history teaches that takings claims are properly evaluated under a multifactor
balancing test." Id.
162 Penn Central Transp, Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. at 127.
I fl 3 id.
Suffice it to say that government regulation — by definition — involves the ad-
justment of rights for the public good. Often this adjustment curtails some potential
for the use or economic exploitation of private property. To require compensation in
all such circumstances would effectively compel the government to regulate bypurchase.
"Government hardly could go on if to some extent values incident to property could not
be diminished without paying for every such change in the general law."
Id. (quoting Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922)).
164
 Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65 (1979).
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and balancing of all the factors involved in a taking dispute, and not merely on whether
the regulation caused a permanent physical occupation.'"
IL RATIONALE OF LORETTO V. TELEPROMPTER MANHATTAN CATV CORP.
A. The Majority Opinion
In Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.,'" Justice Marshall, writing for the
Court, affirmed a per se rule that any permanent physical occupation of private property
by government was automatically a taking without regard to other factors such as the
regulation's economic impact or the public interest in the regulation.'" Thus, in Loretto the
Court found that a New York State law authorizing the installation of cable television
equipment on a privately owned apartment building constituted a taking. 1 e"
The Court began its examination of the claim that the action authorized by the
statute constituted a taking by setting forth broad principles governing takings clause
analysis. The Court acknowledged that no set formula or rigid rule existed to determine
when a governmental action or regulation constituted a taking.'" It observed that
ordinarily the Court engaged in an ad hoc factual inquiry, examining the factors identified
in Penn Central, namely, the economic impact of the regulation, its interference with
investment-backed expectations and the character of the government action.'" The
Court also recognized that prior decisions had upheld substantial regulation of private
property against taking challenges if the regulation was deemed to be reasonably related
to the promotion of substantial public interest."' The Loretto Court, however, regarded
physical intrusion as a property restriction of an unusually serious character. When the
physical intrusion reached the extreme form of a permanent physical occupation, a taking
automatically occurred, according to the Court.'" The Court regarded a permanent
physical occupation not just as an important factor in a taking analysis, but as the
determinative one.'"
After establishing that a permanent physical occupation constituted a taking, the
Court turned to a discussion of the reasons underlying this rule. First, the Court
surveyed previous cases involving the question of when government action constituted a
taking. 174 Implicit in these cases, in the Court's view, was a distinction between government
actions involving a permanent physical occupation of property and those involving either
16 i Loretto, 458 U.S. at 447 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). ''Precisely because the extent to which the
government may injure private interests now depends so little on whether or not it has authorized a
'physical contact,' the Court has avoided per se takings rules resting on outmoded distinctions between
physical and non-physical intrusions." Id.
166 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
I" Id. at 426.
' 65
 Id. at 425.
' 69 Id. at 426.
lt° Id.
'' Id.
' 2 Id. The court stated: "Our cases further establish that when the physical intrusion reaches
the extreme form of a permanent physical occupation, a taking has occurred. In such a case, the
character of the 'government action' not only is an important factor in resolving whether the action
works a taking but is determinative." Id.
in Id.
"1 Id. at 426-36.
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a temporary invasion or damage with no accompanying occupation.' 75 According to the
Court, previous cases established that a taking automatically occurred in the former
situation. The public interest in such a regulation or its minimal economic impact was
irrelevant,'" The majority stated that the Court had never failed to find a taking when
presented with a permanent physical occupation of property. 177 The distinction between
permanent physical occupations and temporary invasions, the majority observed, was
present in the nineteenth century flooding cases."' It noted that a taking was found in
these cases only when property was permanently inundated with water or other material
so as to permanently destroy or impair the land's usefulness.'" If the impairment was
temporary or if it was the consequence of some action carried on by the government
outside the property, a taking was never found according to the Loretto Court's° The
Court also noted that later cases clearly established that the permanent occupation of land
by such installations as telephone lines, telegraph wires and underground pipes were
takings regardless of the insubstantial space occupied or the lack of interference with
the owner's use of his land."'
Continuing its analysis of precedent, the Loretto Court found that recent precedent
recognized the traditional distinction between permanent physical occupations, physical
invasion short of an occupation, and mere regulation of land use.'" The Court conceded
that the most recent cases stated or implied that a physical invasion was subject to a
"balancing process." 1 " 3 In the Court's view, however, these cases did not imply that a
permanent physical occupation was ever subject to such a balancing process.'" The Court
pointed out that the most recent cases had not dealt with a regulation which involved a
permanent physical occupation.' 85 Thus, in Loretto, the Court determined that recent
precedent applied only to cases involving physical invasions short of a permanent physical
occupation, or to non-possessory regulations of land use,'" According to the Court,
173 lel. at 430. "[R]ecent cases confirm the distinction between a permanent physical occupation,
a physical invasion short of an occupation, and a regulation that merely restricts the use of property."
Id.
17" Id. at 434-35.
In short, when the "character of the governmental action" Penn Central, 438 U.S. at
124, 98 S. Ct. at 2659, is a permanent physical occupation of property, our cases
uniformly have found a taking to the extent of the occupation, without regard to
whether the action achieves an important public benefit or has only minimal economic
impact on the owner.
458 U.S. at 434-35.
177 458 U.S. at 427. "When faced with a constitutional challenge to a permanent physical
occupation of real property, the Court has invariably found a taking." Id.
178 Id. at 427-28.
' 1 " Id. at 428.
'" Id. The court said:
Since these early cases, this Court has consistently distinguished between flooding
cases involving a permanent physical occupation, on the one hand, and cases involving
a more temporary invasion, or government action outside the owner's property, that
causes consequential damages within, on the other. A taking has always been found
only in the former situation.
Id. (citations omitted).
181 Id. at 429-30.
182
 Id, at 430.
"3 Id. at 430-32.
184
 Id. at 432.
"3 Id.
186 Id. at 430-34.
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recent precedent did not affect the traditional rule that a permanent physical occupation
was a taking per se.' 87 On the contrary, in the Court's opinion, recent cases emphasized
that physical invasion cases were special.'" For example, the Loretto majority indicated
that the Court's most recent "complete discussion" of the takings clause in Penn Central
Transportation Co. v. New York City, did not repudiate the rule that a permanent physical
occupation of property was a taking per se. 189 Moreover, Kaiser Aetna v. United States, while
not addressing a permanent physical occupation, did indicate, in the Loretto Court's view,
that physical invasion by government was a particularly serious type of property regula-
tion,'" The Court also detected the distinction between permanent occupations and
temporary invasions in PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, and used it to distinguish
PruneYard from the facts in Loretto."' The Loretto Court pointed out that the physical
invasion in PruneYard had not heed determinative of a taking because it was temporary in
nature. The property owner, moreover, was able to regulate the time, place and manner
of the invasion su as to minimize interference with his business." 2 Unlike Loretto, Prune-
Yard did not involve a permanent physical occupation and therefore did not affect the
traditional rule embraced by the majority, that a permanent physical occupation was
always a taking.'"
Upon concluding its analysis of precedent, the Court examined a second reason
supporting its decision, the purpose of the taking clause. According to the Loretto Court,
the taking clause was designed to protect properly interests.'" The Court emphasized
that an owner's ability to possess, use, and dispose of his property were the most treasured
strands of the traditional bundle of private property rights.'" In the Court's view, a
permanent physical occupation by a stranger was the most serious, and qualitatively, the
most severe interference with each of those rights.'" Those protected rights, moreover,
extended to as much space above the ground as the owner could use or occupy.' 97
 Thus, it
'" Id. at 432.
'" Id.
'"9
	
"[Penn Central] does not repudiate the rule that a permanent physical occupation is a
government action of such a unique character that it is a taking without regard to other factors that a
court might ordinarily examine." Id. (footnote omitted). For a discussion of Penn Central, see supra
notes 105-48 and accompanying text.
1 " 458 U.S. at 433. For a discussion of Kaiser Aetna see supra notes 153-59 and accompanying
text.
'" 458 U.S. at 433. The court declared that PruneYard "underscores the constitutional distinc-
tion between a permanent occupation and a temporary physical invasion." Id. For a discussion of
PruneYard see supra notes 150 - 52 and accompanying text.
`" 458 U.S. at 434.
i" Id. at 432, 434.
194
 Id. at 435.
j" Id. at 435-36.
196 Id. at 435. The Court explained its view as follows:
To the extent that the government permanently occupies physical property, it effec-
tively destroys each of these rights. First, the owner has no right to possess the occupied
space himself, and also has no power to exclude ihe occupier from possession and use
of the space.... Second, the permanent physical occupation of property forever denies
the owner any power to control the use of the property; . . . Finally, even though the
owner may retain the hare legal right to dispose of the occupied space by transfer or
sale, the permanent occupation of that space by a stranger will ordinarily empty the
right of any va l ue „
Id. (Citations omitted).
197 Id. at 438 n,16 (quoting United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 264 (1946)).
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was irrelevant to the Loretto Court that the amount of space occupied was minimal" and
that the plaintiff had not previously used that space.' 99 In the Court's view the relevant
factor was the existence of any permanent physical invasion, no matter how inconsequen-
t i apoo
Finally, in addition to its consistency with the purpose of the taking clause, the Court
also suggested that the per se rule avoided difficult line-drawing problems. 20 ' By deeming
every permanent physical occupation of property a taking, the Court would not have to
engage in disputes over whether an occupation was significant enough to constitute a
taking.202 The rule, moreover, presented few problems of proof in the Court's view. 203 A
permanent physical occupation was easily identified."' While the extent of the occupation
was a relevant factor in determining the amount of compensation clue, it was not impor-
tant in determining whether a taking had occurred. 205 A claimant need only show that the
placement of a fixed structure on land had occurred. According to the Court, such a fact
was rarely subject to dispute. 2"
After establishing that a per se rule would apply to permanent physical occupations of
property, the Court rejected Teleprompter's attempt to justify section 828 as a permissi-
ble regulation of the use of rental property. 207 The Court rejected Teleprompter's argu-
ment that the New York taw prohibiting landlords from interfering with the installation
of cable television equipment was similar to other rental property regulations which had
survived takings challenges.204 The distinction, according to the Court, was that section
828 authorized a third party, a stranger, to occupy space on the owner's building. 2 " The
Court had already emphasized that an invasion by a stranger was qualitatively more
severe than that caused by other regulations. 2 ` 0 Thus, in the Loretto majority's view,
section 828 was not analogous to rental property regulations which allowed a landlord to
retain control and possession of the installations and the space they occupied. 2 " Valid
regulations did not require the landlord to tolerate a physical occupation of his property
by a third party.212 Consequently, in the Court's view, rental property regulations and
section 828 were distinguishable. While the first were appropriately analyzed under the
multifactor balancing test, section 828 was subject to a per se rule since it authorized a
permanent physical occupation of property by a third party. 2 "
In summary the Court held that a permanent physical occupation was a taking
because the owner entertained an historically rooted expectation of compensation. In
10" 458 U.S. at 438 n.16. "[W]hether the installation is a taking does not depend on whether the
volume of space it occupies is bigger than a bread box." Id. See also id. at 437 & n.13.
' 22 Id. at 437.
200 Id .
2" Id. at 436-37.
202 Id.
203 Id. at 437.
204 Id .
"2 Id. at 437-38.
2" Id.
2 " Id. at 438-39. The Court stated: "We fail to see, however, why a physical occupation of one
type of property but not another is any less a physical occupation." Id. at 439.
2" Id. at 440. For specific examples of valid regulations which require landlords to make
physical attachments to rental property see id. at 437 n.7 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
2°' Id. at 440.
21 ° Id. at 436.
211 Id. at 436, 440 n.19.
212 Id. at 440.
312 Id.
476	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol, 25:459
addition, the character of the invasion caused by a permanent occupation was qualita-
tively more severe than other categories of property regulation.'" The Court expressly
stated that its decision did not question a state's broad power to impose use restrictions on
private propert.y. 2 '
B. The Dissenting Opinion in Loretto
Justice Blackmun, joined by Justices Brennan and White, wrote the dissenting opin-
ion. 2 ' 6 Justice Blackmun called the majority opinion a "curiously anachronistic deci-
sion."'" The dissent rejected the Court's conclusion that the per se rule was strongly
grounded in precedent. 2 'e In the dissent's view, the early precedent cited by the Court.
lacked any vitality outside the agrarian context in which it was decided and stood for a
constitutional rule that was unsuited to a modern urban age.''' In contrast, the dissent
asserted, history indicated that takings claims were properly evaluated under a multifac-
tor balancing test. 22 " Recent precedent, the dissent maintained, expressly held that a
minor physical intrusion was not determinative of a taking. 222 Consequently, the dissent.
agreed with the New York Court of Appeals' straightforward application of the balancing
test, and its finding that. section 828 was a valid police power regulation designed to
protect the interests of both landlords and tenants, while promoting the development of
cable television. 222 The dissent observed that the economic impact of the physical occupa-
tion in Loretto was minimal. Teleprompter's cables did not affect the value of the property,
nor did they interfere with the plaintiff's investment - backed expectations since she was
unaware of their existence when she invested in the building.'" In the dissent's view,
therefore, such a minor physical intrusion did not constitute a taking under the balancing
test.'? 4
In addition to finding the per se rule inconsistent with precedent, the dissent also
implied that the rule's capacity to distinguish between significant and insignificant losses
was minintal.225
 According to the dissent, recent applicable precedent indicated that
non-physical intrusions such as those caused by zoning laws, were the rule rather than the
exception. 22" The dissent emphasized that such modern non-physical intrusions were
capable of imposing a far greater adverse economic impact on a property owner than that
inflicted by minor physical touchings. 227 Per se rules, the dissent suggested, had been
avoided precisely because the amount of loss suffered by a property owner depended so
little on whether or not the intrusion was a physical one."
2'4
	 at 441.
215
2"
 Id. at 442-56 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
2 " Id. at 442 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
2" Id. at 446-47 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
212 id .
22° Id. at 451 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
221 Id. at 445 (citing PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robbins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980)). The dissent
was essentially adopting and reiterating the reasoning and language of the New York Court of
Appeals' decision in Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 53 N.Y.2d 124, 440 N.Y.S.2d
843, 423 N.E.2d 320 (1981).
222 458 U.S. at 451 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
223 Id. at 445 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
224 Id .
222
	 at 447 (Blackmun J., dissenting).
" 6 Id,
227 Id.
22"
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The dissent also rejected the Court's distinction between permanent physical occupa-
tions and temporary physical invasions. 229 The minority suggested that the distinction was
strained and untenable, and had been erected merely to distinguish Loretto from recent
precedent.2 " Precedent, the dissent asserted, no longer recognized a distinction between
physical and nonphysical interferences with property."' Thus, for the majority to draw
an even finer distinction between permanent and temporary physical invasions was
untenable in the dissent's view.232 The dissent insisted the distinction was without sub-
stance, ambiguous and subject to manipulation by litigants. 233 The minority opinion also
pointed out that an invasion's "permanence" was subject to dispute. 234 Even the occupa-
tion in Loretto was arguably temporary since it lasted only so long as the building was
maintained as rental property, and not forever. 235 Thus, the dissent feared that the
creation of the distinction would merely encourage litigants to mold otherwise insubtan-
fiat claims into the set formula of the per se rule136 and reduce taking analyses into
metaphysical disputes over what was physical and what was temporary. 237
Lastly, the dissent rejected the Court's assertion that section 828 was subject to a per se
rule merely because it substantially interfered with property rights. 2" In the dissent's
opinion, section 828 differed very little from other New York rental property regulations
which had been upheld against takings challenges. 239 Many of those regulations inter-
fered with a landlord's property rights as much, if not more than, section 828. 2" For
example, the dissent noted that landlords were required to install mailboxes which
occupied more than five times the space that Teleprompter's cables did."' A landlord's
ability to use, occupy, or sell his property was affected no more adversely by section 828
than by these other rental property regulations."' Nor was their impact any less severe, in
the dissent's view, because they allowed the landlord and not a third party to make and
maintain the installation. 243 The dissent emphasized, moreover, that the appellant had
admitted that she actually had no other use for the cable occupied space."' In the
dissent's view, the Court's inquiry should he focused on the extent of the invasion's
interference with the owner's property use and not solely on whether an invasion had
occurred. 243 Thus, since the interference authorized by section 828 was similar, and in
some cases less severe, than that authorized by other valid rental property regulations, 246
the dissent saw no reason to differentiate the two merely because under section 828 a
229 Id. at 447-48 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
230
	
at 442 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
231 Id. at 447-48.
132 Id.
233 Id. at 447-50.
234 Id. at 448.
235 Id.
235 Id. at 451.
237 Id. at 450.
238 Id. at 452-53.
239 Id.
2411 Id.
241 Id. at 453.
242 Id. at 451-53.
243 Id. at 449-50.
244 Id. at 453-54.
245 Id. at 453.
246 Id. at 451-52.
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third party was the authorized occupant. 247
 Indeed, in the dissent's view, a landlord was
almost better off under section 828 because the cable television company and not the
owner, was obligated to pay all expenses of installation, maintenance and removal. 218
In sum, the dissent viewed the affirmation of the per se rule by the Court as an
unnecessary and potentially dangerous undermining of well-planned legislation. 24 ° It
viewed section 828 as a careful response to a modern social problem and a new way of
living."' To the dissent, the per se rule was antiquated and unsuited to the solution of
problems precipitated by new technological advances such as cable television."' The
dissent would have analyzed Loretto under the multifactor balancing test in accordance
with the New York Court of Appeals. 252
III. ANALYSIS OF' 	 V. TELEPROMPTER MANHATTAN CATV CORP.
In Loretto the Supreme Court affirmed the rule that all regulations authorizing any
permanent occupation of private property by government were takings without regard to
the public interest served by the regulation or its negligible economic impact on the
regulated property owner. 253 The Court based its rule on what it called a long line of
precedent and on its concern for the protection of traditional property rights. 254 The next
section analyzes the Court's reasoning in Loretto. First, recent taking clause decisions are
examined. 255
 The Loretto majority's conclusion that precedent supports the per se rule is
evaluated.256 It is suggested that Loretto is actually inconsistent with the recent trend
towards the use of a multifactor balancing test in all takings disputes regardless of the
presence or absence of a permanent physical occupation. 257 Recent decisions have indi-
cated that non-possessory regulations are so prevalent in our modern society that a test
based solely on the presence of a permanent physical occupation would be inadequate
and perhaps even inequitable. 25" Second, the Court's contention that the protection of
traditional property rights is served by the per se rule is examined. 25 " It is demonstrated
that non-possessory regulations may be just as harmful to property rights as regulations
authorizing permanent physical occupations. 260 The distinction between takings and
non-takings should thus be based on the extent of the interference with property rights
and not simply whether there has been a partial eviction. 26 ' Finally, it is suggested that the
per se rule may have a disastrous impact on some well-reasoned and useful regulations. 262
In particular, the rule may mandate the invalidation of subdivision exactions, a special-
ized regulation requiring the occupation of subdivision development property by such
24r
	 at 449-50.
248 Id. at 453.
24e
	 at 455-56.
25° Id.
251
252
	 at 456.
1" See supra notes 166.215 and accompanying text.
2" See supra notes 174-206 and accompanying text.
255 See infra notes 265-307 and accompanying text.
2" See infra notes 265-307 and accompanying text.
2 " See infra notes 274.307 and accompanying text.
258
	 infra notes 297-302 and accompanying text.
2" See infra notes 308-45 and accompanying text.
"° See infra notes 308-22 and accompanying text.
2" See infra notes 323-45 and accompanying text.
262 See infra notes 346-414 and accompanying text.
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facilities as sidewalks, roads, and parks. 263 In conclusion, it is suggested that the Loretto
Court should have avoided the affirmation of the per se rule and analyzed the dispute
under the multifactor balancing test, or even under the rationale used by the lower courts
to uphold subdivision exactions. 264
A. The Per Se Rule's Inconsistency with Recent Taking Doctrine
The Loretto majority maintained that its per se rule and its distinction between perma-
nent occupations and temporary invasions had been established in earlier cases. Prece-
dent does not, however, actually define a distinction between permanent occupations and
temporary invasions. A per se rule moreover is inconsistent with recent taking doctrine
and with the implicit policy underlying modern taking analysis.
The distinction between permanent physical occupations and temporary physical
invasions, upon which Loretto's per se rule is based, may have had some merit at one time.
For instance, in the nineteenth century flooding cases cited in Loretto, 265 a taking occurred
only when the government's physical invasion of private property amounted to a perma-
nent ouster of possession.266 Government actions or regulations which merely impaired
or prohibited the use of property were usually not so extreme as to cause an ouster of
possession. Consequently, the Court never invalidated non-possessory government regu-
lations as takings, regardless of their economic impact, under the old test. 267 Rather, in
order to establish a compensable taking, a claimant had to prove that the government
regulation or action caused some physical occupation of a permanent nature, much like
those occasioned when the government pursued formal eminent domain proceedings. 268
For example, the Court found no taking when a temporary dam cut off an owner's access
to his shipping docks. 266 The Court did hind a taking, however, when a permanent dam
caused a back-up of flood waters which permanently inundated the claimant's land and
ousted him from possession.'" In the first instance there was no taking because there was
no permanent separation of the owner from his property, 2 ?i His access to it, and his use
of it were merely impaired.272 In the second instance, however, there was a taking because
the government action had risen to the extreme form of a permanent physical invasion of
property, almost as if the government had formally condemned and appropriated the
land under an eminent domain proceeding. 273 While mere regulations or temporary
impairments were never takings under the old rule regardless of their economic impact,
permanent physical ousters were considered such extreme interferences with property
rights that they rose to the level of a taking. Consequently, the distinction between
temporary invasions and permanent occupations could mean the difference between a
taking and a non-taking under the old rule.
263 See infra notes 346-414 and accompanying text.
264
 See infra note 414 and accompanying text.
2B5 458 U.S. at 427-28.
268 See supra notes 67-71 and accompanying text.
237 See supra notes 63-84 and accompanying text.
2 " See supra notes 63-84 and accompanying text.
289 Co. v. Chicago, 99 U.S. 635, 642-43 (1878).
270
 Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 166, 177.81 (1871).
2 T 1
 Transportation Co. v. Chicago, 99 U.S. 635, 642 (1878).
272 Id .
273
 Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 166, 177-78 (1871).
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In an agrarian society where land was synonymous with wealth, a rule based solely on
the presence or absence of a permanent physical loss of land may have been appropri-
ate.'" At that time land use regulations were rare and a simple rule was probably
sufficient to compensate many of the worst harms. With the turn of the century, however,
increased urban populations required the development of additional restrictions on the
use and occupation of private lands in urban communities. 275 The old rule that a taking
required a showing of a permanent physical ouster became inadequate in a new era where
significant harm was increasingly caused by non-possessory regulations. Consequently,
logic demanded a departure from the distinction between permanent occupations and
temporary invasions, upon which the old rule was based. Indeed a new approach to
taking analyses was introduced in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon. 276
Justice Holmes, writing for the Court in Pennsylvania Coal Co., introduced the idea
that the difference between valid police power regulations and unconstitutional takings
was one of degree, not form. 277
 if a regulation went "too far," according to Holmes, and if
it diminished the value of the regulated property beyond a certain mangnitude, it became
a taking. 27" This approach freed the Court from a literal interpretation of the taking
clause. 279 The term "property" increasingly was perceived as more than just the physical,
tangible piece of real estate.'" Instead, "property" began to be interpreted as the group
of rights inhering in the citizen's relation to the physical thing."' A person's right to
possess, use, and dispose of his land was his "property."'" After Pennsylvania Coal Co.,
therefore, the complete destruction of those rights, even absent a permanent physical
occupation, was often recognized as a taking of "property."'"
Indeed, subsequent case law which elaborated on Holmes' suggestion that takings
disputes should be analyzed on an ad hoc basis implied that physical and non-physical
interferences with property would be analyzed in the same manner. In Penn Central, for
example, the Court expressly noted that set formulae and rigid rules did not exist in
214 ',brat°, 458 U.S. at 447 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
271 Village of Euclid v. Ambler Reality Co., 272 U.S. 365, 386-87 (1926).
276 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
217
	 at 416.
276 Id. at 415.
"9 Kratovil and Harrison, Eminent Domain — Polio, and Concept, 42 CALIF. L. REV. 596, 599
(1954).
One of the earliest controversies to emerge in the law of eminent domain centered
around the meaning to be read into the phrase "taking of property." The Supreme
Court, and many state courts, originally thought of "property" as land itself or some
other tangible object of ownership. This physical approach also extended to the word
"taking." Owing largely, no doubt, to the connotation of the word itself, "taking" was
thought to mean a taking over, an appropriation of the property by the taker for the
latter's own use.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
250 Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 142 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). "The term [property as used in the
Takings Clause] is not used in the 'vulgar and untechnical sense of the physical thing. . . " Id.
(quoting United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 377 (1945)).
2" 438 U.S. at 142-43.
282 Id.
263
	 States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 378 (1945). "Governmental action
short of acquisition of title or occupancy has been held, if its effects are so complete as to deprive the
owner of all or most of his interest in the subject matter, to amount to a taking." Id. (footnote
omitted). See also Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 48-49 (1960) (where the total destruction
by the government of all value of materialmen's liens was held a taking).
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taking analyses.'" On the contrary, according to Penn Central, the Court should engage in
an ad hoc factual inquiry into such factors as the regulation's impact on the owner, its
interference with investment-backed expectations, and the character of the government
action.285 In Penn Central the Court noted that if the government action could be charac-
terized as a physical invasion, it was more likely that a taking would be found, but not that
it must be found. 2 " Penn Central therefore implied that a physical invasion alone did not
constitute a taking. Factors such as the economic impact of the regulation and the public
interest it served were also relevant. 267
Furthermore, in PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 2" the Court expressly refused
to find that a physical invasion of private properly pursuant to a state constitutional right
was determinative of a taking. 2 " In PruneYard, because there was no proof' that a physical
invasion of a privately owned shopping mall by solicitors also caused an adverse economic
impact on the owner, the Court found that a taking had not been established."' Thus,
Penn Central, PruneYard and other recent cases"' indicate that a physical invasion is one
of the factors of a taking analysis, but not necessarily the determinative one. In fact, in
citing PruneYard, the Loretto majority acknowledged that physical invasions alone were
not always determinative of a taking.'" The Court distinguished the activity in Prune-
Yard, however, by characterizing it as a temporary physical invasion subject to the balanc-
ing test, rather than a permanent physical occupation which would have been a taking Per
2Sf. 93
The Court in Loretto was able to avoid the balancing test dictated by PruneYard only
by erecting this distinction between permanent and temporary invasions. 294 This distinc-
tion, however, is not supported by recent precedent. On the contrary, as Loretto tactily
acknowledged, recent precedent indicated that distinctions between physical and non-
physical intrusions were no longer the sole criterion in resolving takings disputes. Accord-
ingly, an even finer distinction between temporary and permanent physical occupations
alone is even less helpful in identifying compensable takings. 295 Consequently, Loretto's
establishment of a modern distinction between types of physical invasions as well as its
294
	 U.S. at 124.
285 Id .
2" Id. at 124. "A 'taking may inure readily be found when the interference with property can be
characterized as a physical invasion by government." Id. (emphasis added).
287 Id.
288 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
289 Id. at 83-84.
290 id .
291
 See Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 166, 174-80 (1979) (although this case involved a
physical invasion of property, the Court did not base its finding of a taking on that factor alone;
rather the Court also looked to other factors such as public interest, economic impact, and interfer-
ence with reasonable investment backed expectations); Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65-66 (1979).
292
 458 U.S. at 434.
"' Id.
294 Id. at 442 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).	 <>,
295 Id. at 447-48 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). As the dissent stated:
Mlle Court draws an even finer distinction today — between "temporary physical
invasions" and "permanent physical occupations" ... an examination of each of the
three words in the Court's "permanent physical occupation" formula illustrates that the
newly-created distinction is even less substantial than the distinction between physical
and non -physical intrusions that the Court already has rejected.
Id.
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establishment of a modern per se rule seem inconsistent with the trend toward the use of
the balancing test in all recent takings disputes. 296
In developing the balancing test, the Court implicitly recognized that a rule based
solely on the presence or absence of a permanent physical invasion was inequitable. Such
a rule would compensate only the few landowners who suffered a permanent physical
invasion of their property, but would leave a great number of landowners who had
suffered real economic harm uncompensated merely because the particular regulation
did riot require a permanent physical invasion. The creation of the multifactor balancing
test indicated that public and private interests should be balanced to determine whether a
regulation's interference with property rights is so excessive as to constitute a taking.
According to Loretto, however, if a regulation requires or authorizes a permanent physical
occupation a taking has occurred and the Court need not examine such factors as the
public interest served by the regulation or its minimal interference with private inter-
ests. 297
 The presence of a permanent physical occupation alone is enough to invalidate a
regulation as a taking.'" In contrast, the individual whose property is subjected to a
regulation which prohibits a certain use, or causes a temporary physical invasion, is not
entitled to such automatic satisfaction according to Loretto."' Rather, in the absence of a
permanent occupation, all other challenged regulations remain subject to the more
complex multifactor balancing test in which the public interest and the extent of the
regulation's economic impact are relevant factors. Recent case law indicates, moreover,
that the claimant must show either that the economic impact of a challenged regulation
was unduly harsh 30° or that it served no reasonable public interest 3 0 ' In most instances
the legislative judgment as to what constitutes an important public interest will be re-
spected by the Court, making it difficult for a claimant to prove otherwise. 3 ° 2
The per se rule announced in Loretto promotes the inequity of automatically compen-
sating some landowners for a minor physical occupation while forcing others to shoulder
the financial burden of public programs which do not cause a physical occupation. The
oft-stated purpose of the fifth amendment's taking clause is to insure that some people
alone do not bear public burdens which in all fairness and justice should be borne by the
public as a whole. 303 The disparity of rewarding some landowners such as Loretto, for
negligible invasions of their property while forcing others to bear sizable economic losses,
is unfair and unjust. It has been suggested that the distinction between valid police power
regulations and unconstitutional taking should depend on the extent and economic
impact of the action and not on whether a partial eviction has occurred. 304 Otherwise, to
enforce the per se rule is to establish a rule which requires compensation in many cases
when the loss is insignificant in return for a bright line rule that identifies some, but by no
29"
	 at 442 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). As Justice Blackmun noted in dissent, Loretto is "a
curiously anachronistic decision." Id.
297 Id. at 434-35.
198 Id .
29° Id. at 426. "Ordinarily, the Court must engage in 'essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries.'" Id.
(quoting Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978))•
309 Penn Central Transp. Co. v, New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 127 (1978).
301 Id.
302 Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922).
3 ° 3
 Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 123 (1978) (citing Armstrong v.
United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960)).
304 Michelman, supra note 60, at 1229. See also Loretto, 458 U.S. at 453 (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
("Any intelligible takings inquiry must . . . ask whether the extent of the State's interference is so
severe as to constitute a compensable taking . . . ").
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means all, compensable takings. 305 The allegedly superior protection of treasured prop-
erty rights afforded by the per se rule3 " as well as the advantage of easy administration, 3 °7
do not justify the disparity and inequity promoted by the per se rule.
B. Traditional Property Rights
In addition to precedent, the Court in Loretto based its decision on the purpose
behind the takings clause to protect the traditional property rights of possession, use and
disposition.'" In its view, a permanent physical occupation effectively destroyed each of
these rights.309 Accordingly, a per se rule was necessary to protect them. 31 ° Although these
traditional property rights are the basis of any taking analysis, it is not clear that a
permanent physical occupation necessarily interferes with them to a greater extent than
other types of invasions or use regulations, or that a per se rule will more effectively
protect them. On the contrary, the per se rule may not further their protection so much as
it may reduce taking disputes to formalistic quibbles over the distinction between a
permanent physical occupation and a temporary physical invasion.'" In addition, the per
se rule may cause the automatic invalidation of carefully planned legislation designed to
promote the common good.
Many non-possessory regulations or temporary invasions can effectively destroy or
impair property rights such that an owner sustains a real economic loss.312 Yet such
regulations have been upheld as valid police power measures to insure the public wel-
fare.'" For instance, the Court has upheld regulations which prohibited the most valu-
able use of property, sometimes decreasing the market value of the property up to almost
88%.3 " It has even upheld a regulation which prohibited the sale of private property
entirely.315 The Court has also upheld a government authorized physical invasion of
private property.'" In Loretto, moreover, the dissent noted that many rental property
regulations which required the installation of such facilities as mailboxes and smoke
detectors often interfered with the landlord's ability to use, occupy and control the space
so occupied. 3 " Yet those regulations had been upheld as constitutionally valid despite the
3 ° 5 Michelman, supra note 60, at 1228.
3" Loretto, 458 U.S. at 435.
307 Id. at 436. "The traditional rule also avoids otherwise difficult line-drawing problems .. .
[and] presents relatively few problems of proof." Id.
Id. at 435-36.
3" Id.
"" Id.
31'
	 at 442-43 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
" 2 See, e.g., Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 384 (1926) (75% diminution
in value caused by zoning law); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 405 (1915) (871/2% diminution
in value).
3" See cases cited supra note 300. See also Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 125, where the Court stated:
"• .• , in instances in which a state tribunal reasonably concluded that 'the health, safety, morals, or
genera] welfare' would be promoted by prohibiting particular contemplated uses of land, this Court
has upheld land use regulations that destroyed or adversely affected recognized real property
interests." Id. (citing Gorieb v. Fox, 274 U.S. 603, 608 (1972); Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.,
272 U.S. 365 (1926)).
3 ' 4 Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 405 (1915).
315 Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 52-5 (1979) (Eagle Protection Act and Migratory Bird Treaty
prohibiting the sale of lawfully obtained eagle feathers upheld against a takings challenge).
318
	
Shopping Center v. Robbins, 447 U.S. 74, 88 (1982). 	 •
317 458 U.S. at 453 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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fact that they required sometimes larger portions of common space, and were just as
permanent as the cable television installation authorized by section 828. 3 " It is conceiv-
able that the space occupied by the mailboxes could be more useful to the landlord than
admittedly otherwise useless space on his roof occupied by cables 3 19 The mailboxes,
furthermore, are as temporary as the cables. Only as long as the owner uses his or her
property as rental property is he required to maintain mailboxes and, under section 828,
cable television equipment. 32 ° Finally, unlike section 828, other rental property regula-
tions require a landlord to make the installations at his own expense. 321
 Under section
828, however, the landlord not only controlled the installation of cable facilities through
the imposition of reasonable conditions, but also paid nothing for the service. The cable
television company was required to pay the costs of installation, maintenance and re-
moval, while indemnifying the landlord for any damages caused by the equipment. 322
Thus, it is clear that section 828 was similar to other rental property regulations in many
respects, and even more protective of the landlord's interests in others.
The Loretto Court determined, however, that the interference with property rights
occasioned by section 828 required a per se rule to protect those rights. 323 Yet use
regulations and rental property regulations were as capable of adversely affecting those
rights as section 828. Prior to Loretto the Court never invoked a per se rule to protect
property rights from their interference. Indeed, as the dissent asserted, per se rules were
avoided precisely because the extent to which property interests could be injured de-
pended so little on whether a physical touching occurred. 324 Thus, the Court's contention
that section 828 was justly invalidated under the per se rule because it interfered with
property rights is "logically untenable."325
The qualifying distinction, according to the Loretto Court, between section 828 and
other regulations, especially rental property regulations, was that section 828 authorized a
third party to make the permanent physical occupation. 326 While other regulations
required the installation of facilities, they did not require the owner to sacrifice his
dominion and control over that space to a stranger."' In the Court's view, the intrusion of
a stranger was qualitatively more severe than that caused by any other regulation.326 The
Court never demonstrated, however, how the intrusion by a third party was qualitatively
318 Id.
New York landlords are required by law to provide and pay for mail boxes that
occupy more than five times the volume that Teleprompter's cable occupies on appel-
lant's building . . . . If the state constitutionally can insist that appellant make this
sacrifice so that her tenants may receive mail, it is hard to understand why the state may
not require her to surrender less space, filled at another's expense, so that those same
tenants can receive television signals.
Id. (citation omitted).
3 " Id. at 453-54.
323 N.Y. EXEC. Law § 828 (McKinney 1982). For the language of the statute,see supra note 32.
32 ' 458 U.S. at 435 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
322 N.Y. EXEC. LAW, § 828 (McKinney 1982). For the language of the statute, see supra note 32.
323 458 U.S. at 435-36.
324 Id. at 447 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
'" Id.
323 Id. at 436.
327 Id .
328 Id. ("an owner suffers a special kind of injury when a stranger directly invades and occupies
the owner's property").
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more severe than other rental regulations. 329 Just as a landlord was unable to use, occupy
or exploit the space occupied by mailboxes and fire escapes, Loretto admitted she could
not use, occupy or exploit the space occupied by Teleprompter's cables. 330 Under section
828, moreover, the landlord did have control over his property since Teleprompter was
subject to all reasonable conditions that a landlord might impose on the installation of the
equipment."' Thus, if anything, section 828 provided greater protection of landlords'
rights than other rental regulation. Lastly, if the landlord decided to sell his apartment
building, the cable service would probably enhance the building's market value rather
than interfere with the traditional property right of disposition. 332
The dissent's characterization of section 828 as a rental property regulation, more-
over, underscores the ambiguity of the per se rule. In Loretto, for example, it is arguable
that the presence of the cables on Loretto's building was temporary rather than perma-
nent. The dissent characterized section 828 simply as a condition of rental property use
that was imposed, not forever, but only for as long as the subject property was used as
rental property. 333 The dissent, asserted that Loretto could have ended the "permanent"
occupation by Teleprompter's equipment by converting her apartment building into a
warehouse.334 Since section 828 applied to rental property only, Loretto could then force
Teleprompter to remove its equipment and thereby convert its permanent occupation
into a temporary invasion.335 Thus, the per se rule is ambiguous because of the potential
difficulty in distinguishing permanent occupations from temporary invasions. Such am-
biguity may encourage property owners to mold their facts to fit the set formula of the per
se rule and engage the Court in endless debates in semantics. 338 Such ambiguity and
inability to identify all regulations which constitute takings may undercut carefully
planned legislation in the public interest more than it will afford greater protection for
traditional property rights.
The balancing lest, on the other hand, allows the Court to protect traditional property
rights without introducing rigidity. Instead of focusing on whether or not the invasion is
permanent or temporary, the Court focuses on the extent and impact of the invasion."'
Moreover, under the balancing test, the Court has expressly held that if the subject.
regulation can be characterized as a physical invasion it is more likely, but not necessary,
that a taking will be found.333 This flexibility and balanced approach is more in line with
the common recognition that property rights may be interfered with to a certain extent to
insure the public welfare. 339 Accordingly, the question should not be whether property
rights have been impaired, but to what extent. For instance, the New York Court of
"I" Id. at 452 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
"° Id. at 452-53 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
3" See supra note 32.
332 458 U.S. at 452 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
333 Id. at 447 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
'" Id. at 448. "1f appellant occupies her own building, or concerts it into a commercial property,
she becomes perfectly free to exclude Teleprompter from her one-eighth cubic foot of roof space."
Id.
335 Id.
336 Id. at 442-43, 451 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
337 See supra notes 105-65 and accompanying text.
336 See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
335
' Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922). "Government hardly could go on
if to some extent values incident to property could not be diminished without paying for every such
change in the general law." Id.
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Appeals applied the balancing test. in Loretto."' It found that section 828 was a well
planned legislative program to balance private interests while promoting the public
interest in the increased communication and education available through cable televi-
sion."' The lower court found, moreover, that section 828's interference with the plain-
tiff's property rights was minimal due to the insignificant amount of space occupied by
the equipment. 342 Accordingly, the lower court refused to find the physical invasion
authorized by section 828 determinative of a taking. 343
The balancing process used by the Supreme Court prior to Loretto, and by the New
York Court. of Appeals in Loretto, provides sufficient protection for the property rights
with which the Loretto Court was so concerned. A permanent physical invasion is certainly
a factor of major significance, and can be given great weight. under the balancing test."' It
does not necessarily follow, however, that it should be a conclusive factor, since a perma-
nent physical occupation may in some cases cause less interference with property rights
than that caused by non-physical or temporary invasions. 345 Moreover, the balancing test
gives the Court the flexibility to uphold regulations which cause permanent physical
occupations, yet which serve such an important public interest as to outweigh the inter-
ference with the owner's property rights. An example of regulations which arguably cause
permanent physical occupations of private land for public use, but. which have been
upheld as serving an important public interest, are subdivision property regulations. The
impact of the Loretto case, specifically, its effect on the validity of subdivision exactions,
must be considered.
C. The Implications of Loretto for Subdivision Exactions
Some subdivision development regulations, known as subdivision exactions, require a
subdivision developer to denote specified portions of his land for such public uses as
sidewalks ,346 roads ,347 sewers,348 parks,349 and even schools."' The donation is generally
a prerequisite to the approval of the developer's subdivision plan, without which he
cannot legally subdivide."' An exaction is not just a regulation requiring the subdivider
to use his property as a sidewalk, road, or park. Rather, an exaction requires a permanent
conveyance of the developer's title to the designated land to the township or municipality
3 " Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 53 N.Y.2d 124, 144-5, 440 N.Y.S.2d 843,
853, 423 N.E.2d 320, 330 (1980).
3" Id. at 143-44, 440 N.Y.S.2d at 852, 423 N.E.2d at 329.
34 ' Id. at 154-55, 440 N.Y.S.2d at 859, 423 N.E.2d at 336.
343 id.
344 See supra note 286 and accompanying text.
3" See supra notes 297-307 and accompanying text.
346 See, e.g., Allen v. Stockwell, 210 Mich. 488, 489, 178 N.W. 27, 28 (1920).
Sre, e.g., Ayres v. City Council of Los Angeles, 34 Cal. 2d 31, 33-4. 207 1'.2(1 1, 3 (1949).
346
	 e.g., Mefford v. City of Tulare, 102 Cal. App. 2d 919, 921, 228 P.2d 847, 850 (Dist. Ct.
App. 1951).
310 See e.g., Associated Home Builders of the Greater East Bay, Inc. v. City of Walnut Creek, 4
Cal. 3d 033, 635, 94 Ca]. Rptr. 630, 631, 484 P.2d 606, 608 (1971); Jenad, Inc. v. \Tillage of Scarsdale,
18 N.Y.2d 78, 82, 271 N.Y.S.2d 955, 956, 218 N.E.2d 673, 674 (1966); Jordan v. Village of
Menomonee Falls, 28 Wis. 2d 608, 610, 137 N.W.2d 442, 443-44 (1965).
350 See e.g., Rosen v. Village of Downers Grove, 19 III. 2d 448, 451, 167 N.E.2d 230, 232-33
(1960).
351 4 R. ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING § 23.24 at 105-6 (2d ed. 1976).
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in which the development is located."' By virtue of the exaction, the developer loses
dominion, control and possession of the designated property."' Land that otherwise
would have been available to him for development and sale becomes permanently oc-
cupied by such public facilities as sewers, roads, parks and schools.354 In return for this
permanent physical occupation by the public, the subdivider receives no compensation."'
If he refuses to make the donation, with its concomitant loss, however, his subdivision
plans will not be approved and any subdivision development activity would be illega1. 356
Subdivision exactions are not unlike rental property regulations such as the regula-
tion challenged in Loretto.35 ' Both the subdivider and a New York owner of rental
property must generally comply with all applicable exactions or regulations in order
legally to use their respective property as either a subdivision development.'" or an
apartment building.'" A subdivider, for instance, is required to allow a permanent
physical occupation of his property by such public facilities as sidewalks, roads and
parks-36 ° Similarly, under section 828 of the New York Executive Laws, a New York
apartment building owner was required to allow the permanent physical occupation of his
property by cable television facilities in the interest of better public communication and
ed ucat ion . 361
Loretto made it clear, however, that rental property regulations which authorized a
permanent physical occupation of property were invalid as unconstitutional takings.'"
Subdivision exactions have been similarly challenged as unconstitutional takings of prop-
erty.'" Yet the lower courts have almost uniformly upheld them even though they require a
permanent physical occupation of property of a far greater magnitude than that required
in Loretto.'" Only a very few lower courts have invalidated subdivision exactions. In
352
	 § 23.25 at 106.
363
	 e.g., Associated Home Builders of the Greater East Bay, Inc. v. City of Walnut Creek, 4
Cal. 3d 633, 635, 94 Cal. Rptr. 630, 631, 484 P.2d 606, 608 (1971) (subdivider required to dedicate
2-1/2 acres of park land for each 1000 new residents); Collis v. City of Bloomington, 310 Minn. 5, 8,
246 N.W.2d 19, 20-1 (1976) (subdivider required to dedicate 10% of his undeveloped land to public
purpose); Billings Properties, Inc. v. Yellowstone County, 144 Mont. 25, 28-9, 394 P.2d 182, 184-85
(1964) (subdivider required to dedicate 119 to 1/12 of land shown on subdivision plot).
364 Johnston, Constitutionality of Subdivision Control Exactions: The Quest for a Rationale, 52 CORNELL
L.Q. 871, 873 (1967). 'From a . . . developer's standpoint, imposition of any of these devices by a
municipality can adversely affect the profitability of his enterprise." Id.
3" ANDERSON, supra note 351, § 23.24 at 106.
s66 Id. § 23.17 at 80.
3s"
	
the text of the regulation involved in Loretto, see supra note 32.
3" See, e.g., Collis v. City of Bloomington, 310 Minn. 5, 248 N.W.2d 19 (1976). Collis upheld
MINN. STAT. § 462.358 (Supp. 1971), which authorized Minnesota municipalities to require subdivid-
ers to donate reasonable portions of their proposed subdivision developments to the public for public
use as parks and playgrounds, or in the alternative contribute a fee in lieu thereof. Collis v. City of
Bloomington, 310 Minn. 5, 7-8, 248 N.W.2d 19, 20-21 (1976).
339 See, e.g., N.Y. MULT. DWELL. LAW §§ 35 (McKinney 1974) (requiring entrance doors and
lights); 36 (McKinney 1974) (windows and skylights for public halls), 53 (Supp. 1982) (fire escapes),
57 (Supp. 1982) (halls and mail receptacles), 62 (Supp. 1982) (parapet walls and guardrails on roofs).
"° See cases cited supra notes 333-36.
"' See supra note 32.
458 U.S. at 441.
363 See, e.g., cases cited supra notes 346 -49.
3" See, e.g., cases cited supra notes 346-49. In upholding the constitutionality of a subdivision
exaction statute, the California Supreme Court stated: "The clear weight of authority upholds the
constitutionality of statutes similar to section 11546." Associated Home Builders of the Greater East
Bay, Inc. v. City of Walnut Creek, 4 Cal. 3d 633, 644; 94 Cal. Rptr. 630, 640, 484 P.2d 606, 615
(1971).
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Berg Development Co. v. City of Missouri City, 3" for example, a Texas court invalidated it park
dedication req uirement . 366 The Texas court held that such exactions were appropriations
of realty without compensation and not merely regulations of property use. 367 I t asserted,
moreover, that. to allow exactions to encroach on private property rights under the guise of
protecting the public's welfare, was to make a mockery of the Constitution. 366
The majority of the lower courts, however, have upheld exactions, characterizing
them either as voluntary donations, 369 valid conditions of subdivision approval 2 " or valid
police power regulations to protect the public health, safety, and welfare. 3" Under the
first of these theories, some courts have suggested that since the developer is not being
forced to subdivide his land, any donation of land he makes for a public purpose is
voluntary.372 Under this theory, because the subdivider's decision to subdivide is volun-
tary, any permanent physical occupation that occurs as a result of subdivision, is also
voluntary and not a taking. 373 If the developer wants to avoid the donation, he may simply
refrain from subdividing and hold or sell his property as one large undivided lot."'
Other courts have reasoned that the ability to subdivide is a privilege conferred by
the government and which the government may condition as it wishes.375 This theory is
similar to the voluntary theory. According to the courts, the government is not forcing the
developer to dedicate his land. 376 On the contrary, it is merely imposing conditions on its
approval of the proposed subdivision. 377 As the courts note, the act of subdivision allows a
"3 603 S.W.2d 273 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980).
3" Id. at 275.
367 Id. "Clearly, with this provision, there is no room for the contention that appellee is merely
regulating the use of appellant's realty. Appellant's realty is no longer involved once the city exercises
this option." Id.
368 Id.
3" See infra notes 372-73 and accompanying text.
"° See infra notes 374-80 and accompanying text.
377 See infra notes 381-86 and accompanying text.
372 See, e.g., Ridgefield Land Co. v. City of Detroit, 241 Mich. 468, 472, 217 N.W. 58, 59 (1928).
"[T]he city is not trying to compel a dedication. It cannot compel the plaintiff to subdivide its
property or to dedicate any part of it.. .. In theory at least, the owner of a subdivision voluntarily
dedicates sufficient land for streets," Id. For an additional discussion of the voluntary theory, see
Billings Properties, Inc. v. Yellowstone County, 144 Mont. 25, 32-33, 394 P.2d 182, 186-87 (1964);
Johnston, supra note 341, at 876-81.
373
 Ridgefield Land Co. v. City of Detroit, 241 Mich. 468, 472, 217 N.W. 58, 59 (1928).
3" See supra note 372.
3 " See, e.g., In re Brous v. Smith, 304 N.Y. 164, 170, 106 N.E.2d 503, 506-07 (1952). The
privilege-condition theory is also discussed in Jordan v. Village of Menomonee Falls, 28 Wis. 2d 608,
619-20, 137 N.W.2d 442, 448 (1965); Johnston, supra note 354, at 881-85. One such court reasoned:
[T]he town here ... does not seek to condemn land owned by the petitioner. It is
petitioner who wishes to construct dwellings on his property, and the town merely
conditions its approval with reasonable conditions designed for the protection both of
the ultimate purchasers of the home and of the public.
Id.
376 See supra note 375.
377 See, e.g., Ayres v. City Council of Los Angeles, 34 Cal. 2d 31, 42, 207 P.2d 1, 7 (1949).
It is the petitioner who is seeking to acquire the advantages of lot subdivision and
upon him rests the duty of compliance with reasonable conditions for design, dedica-
tion, improvement and restrictive use of the land so as to conform to the safety and
general welfare of the lot owners in the subdivision and of the public.
Id.
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developer to sell his property in a more profitable manner. 378 For this privilege, it is not
unreasonable, in the view of some courts, to require a subdivider to comply with certain
conditions such as the permanent donation of land for public use. 379 As long as the
exactions or conditions arc not arbitrary and are necessitated by the developer's activity,
many lower courts have upheld them against takings challenges.38 °
These two theories, the voluntary theory and the condition-privilege theory are still
used by some courts. A third theory, however, the police power theory, is the most widely
used basis for upholding subdivision exactions."' According to this theory, a subdivision
attracts to an area new people who would not otherwise be a local concern. 382 The influx of
new people requires the installation of new services such as sewers, roads, sidewalks and
schools. A subdivision without these facilities, without proper sanitation, access for emer-
gency vehicles, and recreation areas, endangers the public health, safety and ‘velfare. 383
Since it is decidedly within the states' police power to protect the public, the states may, in
the courts' view, exact land from developers to insure that the development will not so
endanger the public. 384 If the exactions are within the enabling legislation, if they are not
arbitrary and are reasonably necessary to promote the public welfare, and if it is the
developer's subdivision activity which necessitates the exactions, many courts will uphold
the exactions as valid police power regulations.385 It is implicit in the courts' reasoning that
the public interest in a clear, safe community outweighs any loss imposed on the devel-
opers by the exactions. 3"
'" See, e.g., Associated Home Builders of Greater East Bay, Inc. v. City of Walnut Creek, 4 Cal.
3d 633, 644-65, 94 Cal. Rim. . 630, 640-43, 484 P.2d 606, 615 (1971); Jordan v. Village of
Menomonee Falls, 28 Wis. 2d 608, 619-20, 137 N.W.2d 442, 448 (1965).
3" See, e.g., cases cited supra note 378.
"' See, e.g., Home Builders Ass'n of Greater Kansas City v. City of Kansas City, 55 S.W.2d 832,
835 (Mo. 1977). "If the requirement is within the statutory grant of power to the municipality and if
the burden cast upon the subdivider is reasonably attributable to his activity, then the requirement is
permissible... ." Id, For additional cases employing the condition - privilege theory, see Collis v. City
of Bloomington, 310 Minn. 5, 11-20, 246 N.W.2d 19, 22-27 (1976); Jordan v. Village of Menomonee
Falls, 28 Wis. 2d 608, 617-18, 137 N.W.2d 442, 447-48 (1965).
39 ' See, e.g., Associated Home Builders of Greater East Bay, Inc. v. City of Walnut Creek, 4 Cal.
3d 633, 644-45, 94 Cal. 630, 640-43, 484 P.2d 606, 615 (1971) ("The rationale of the cases affirming
constitutionality indicate the dedication statutes are valid under the state's police power."). Jordan v.
Village of Menomonee Falls, 28 Wis. 2d 608, 619-20, 137 N.W.2d 442, 448-49 (1965) ("We conclude
that a required dedication of land for school, park or recreational sites as a condition for approval of
the subdivider's plot should be upheld as a valid exercise of police power ...."); Ayres v. City Council
of Los Angeles, 34 Cal. 2d 31, 42, 207 P.2d 1, 7-8 (1949); Jenad Inc. v. Village of Scarsdale, 18
N.Y.2d 78, 85, 271 N.Y.S. 955, 958-59, 218 N.E.2d 673. 676 (1966).
"' See, e.g., Wald Corp. v. Metropolitan Dade County, 338 So.2d 863, 867 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1976); Jordan v. Village of Menomonee Falls, 28 Wis. 2d 608, 619-20, 137 N.W.2t1 442, 448 (1965).
383 Johnston supra note 354 at 923. "[A]il subdivision control exactions are grounded upon a
judgment that subdivisions which do not provide adequate space for streets, utilities, parks and other
public uses are defective."
3" See e.g., In re Brous v. Smith, 304 N.Y. 164, 170, 160 N.E.2d 503, 506-07 (1952); Ayres v.
City Council of Los Angeles, 34 Cal. 2d 31, 38-41, 207 P.2d 1, 5.7 (1949); Collis v. City of
Bloomington, 310 Minn. 5, 15-16, 246 N.W.2d 19, 25 (1976).
"3 Id.
3" See, e.g., Mansfield & Swett, Inc. v. Town of West Orange, 120 N.J. 145, 150, 198 A. 225, 229
(1938) (upholding a board's authority to impose reasonable restrictions on subdivision develop-
ments), There the court stated:
The state possesses the inherent authority - it antedates the Constitution - to
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Regardless of which theory is used, the lower courts have been circumspect in their
treatment of subdivision exactions. Instead of detailing exactly why the exactions do not
constitute takings, the decisions tend to uphold them in a conclusory fashion, simply
calling them voluntary donations, valid conditions, or permissible police power regula-
tions." 7 There are indications, however, that the courts have actually engaged in a type of
balancing process in upholding subdivision exactions. 388 In the process, the courts seem
to be weighing the public interest in the orderly growth of their community and the
subdivider's ability to reap a profit against the invasion of the subdivider's property rights
occasioned by the required donations of land.389 The courts have characterized the
subdivider as a businessman. As such, he is not protecting his hearth and home from
invasion but rather exploiting his property as a profit-making business. 3 " Consequently,
according to this rationale, although it would be constitutionally impermissible to require
a residential lot owner to donate part of his property for a municipal park, it is reasonable
and permissible to require the developer to make the same donation. 39 ' As long as he is
allowed to make a reasonable profit, it is irrelevant that some of his land must be donated
for public facilities.
resort, in the building and expansion of its community life, to such measures as may be
necessary to secure the essential common material and moral needs. The public welfare
is of prime importance; and the correlative restrictions upon undivided rights— either
of person or of property — are incidents of the social order, considered a negligible loss
compares with the resultant advantages to the community as a whole.
Id.
397
	 supra note 354, at 893. As Johnston noted;
When developers have challenged the validity of [subdivision exactions], the sharp
contrast presented between public needs and private interests has caused the American
judiciary to respond to discordant tones. Perhaps more disappointing, however, is the
tendency of the courts to elaborate upon the conclusions reached rather than to discuss
the factors which actually influenced each decision . . .
Id.
" g See Johnston, supra note 354, at 874, 892, 917, 923. See also Associated Home Builders of
Greater East Bay, Inc. v. City of Walnut Creek, 4 Cal. 3d 633, 648, 94 Cal. Rptr. 630, 645, 484 P.2d
606, 618 (1971) ("The desirability of . . . low cost housing cannot be denied and unreasonable
exactions could defeat this object, but these considerations must be balanced against the phenomenon
of the appallingly rapid disappearance of open areas in and around our cities") (emphasis added);
Wald Corp. v. Metropolitan Dade County, 338 So.2d 863, 868 (Ha. Dist. Ct. App. 1976) (an analysis
of a subdivision exaction challenge "requires a balancing of the prospective needs of the community
and the property rights of the developer") (emphasis added).
399 See supra note 388.
390 See supra note 388. As Johnston noted:
The subdivider is a manufacturer, processer, and marketer of a product; land is
but one of his raw materials. In subdivision control disputes, the developer is not
defending hearth and home against the king's intrusion, but simply attempting to
maximize his profits from the sale of a finished product. As applied to him, subdivision
control exactions are actually business regulations.
Johnston, supra note 354, at 923.
39 ' See, e.g., Wald Corp. v. Dade County, 338 So.2d 863, 867 (Fla. Dist. Ct, App. 1976).
Unlike one who merely reserves his property for personal use or sale as a single
tract, the subdivider profits from the sale of lots within the subdivision to prospective
home builders. The local government, in turn, must consider the welfare of the families
who will be filling the development. It is eminently reasonable, therefore, to allow the
municipality to impose certain conditions upon the developer so that it may provide for
the needs of persons who would not otherwise have been a local concern.
Id.
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Presumably, a subdivision exaction would only be struck down if it was so excessive as
to substantially eliminate the developer's profit, or if the exaction was not reasonably
related to the public welfare or the developer's activity. 392 In Ayers v. City Council of Los
Angeles, 393 for example, the Supreme Court of California upheld an exaction which
required a developer to dedicate a ten-foot strip of land for widening a boulevard which
abutted his subdivision and an additional ten-foot strip for planting of trees and shrub-
bery.394 The court rejected the developer's argument that the exaction constituted an
uncompensated taking, finding instead, that the required widening was reasonably re-
lated to the potential traffic needs generated by the subdivision, and that the required
design imposed no undue burden upon the subdivide r.395 Apparently, the court balanced
the developer's profit potential and the public interest in orderly traffic patterns against
the exaction's interference with the developer's property rights to find that the exactions
were reasonable conditions to protect the public and not unconstitutional takings. 396
Many subsequent cases followed Ayres' lead, reasoning that. a subdivider realizes a
profit from governmental approval of a subdivision since his land is rendered more
valuable by virtue of subdivision. 397 In return for this benefit, it has been held that the city
may require him to dedicate a portion of his land for specified purposes whenever the
influx of new residents caused by the subdivision increases the demand for those ser-
vices.398 Thus, although not expressly stated in any subdivision exaction case, it does
appear that the courts are actually balancing the subdivider's profit and the public interest
against the exaction's interference with his property rights. The characterization of the
developer as a profit-making businessman would explain why subdivision exactions do
not constitute takings when applied to developers, where they would if applied to single
family lot. owners. 399
One important factor in this balancing process, however, is the permanent taking
over of part of the subdivider's property without compensation."° The strict enforce-
ment of Loretto's per se rule in subdivision exaction cases would prohibit the courts from
392 See Jordan v. Village of Menomonee falls, 28 Wis. 2d 608, 619-20, 137 N.W.2d 442, 448
(1965):
The basis for upholding a compulsory land-dedication requirement in a plotting
ordinance . . . is this: The municipality by approval of a proposed subdivision plot
enables the subdivider to profit financially by setting the subdivision lots as home-
budding sites and thus realizing a greater price than could have been obtained if he had
sold his property as unploned lands. I n return for this benefit the municipality may
require him to dedicate part of his plotted land to meet a demand to which the
municipality would not have been put but for the influx of people into the community
to occupy the subdivision lots.
Id. See ak.0;;upra note 380 and accompanying text (exactions upheld if not arbitrary and necessitated
by developers' activity).
"' 34 Cal, 2d 31, 207 P.2d 1 (1949).
3" Id. at 33-34, 207 P.2d at 2-3.
395 Id. at 39-41, 207 P.2d at 6-7. In fact, the court found that the developer's position was greatly
improved because of the particular type of exactions imposed. Id. The exactions ordinarily imposed
would have required him to make a more extensive dedication at a greater cost to him. Id. Conse-
quently, the exactions actually imposed resulted in a savings in land and cost to the developer. Id.
396 See Johnston, supra note 354 at 892.
"T See supra note 378 and accompanying text.
393 See supra notes 378-80 and accompanying text.
399 See supra notes 390-91 and accompanying text.
400 See supra notes 351-55 and accompanying text.
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engaging in any balancing process."' Loretto expressly held that any permanent physical
occupation of property was a taking regardless of the public interest involved 402 or type of
property occupied. 403 Consequently, all subdivision exactions would be necessarily invali-
dated as takings. The courts would no longer be able to distinguish between subdivision
development property and single tract residential lots. A determination under Loretto's per
se rule that subdivision exactions constituted unconstitutional takings would have a seri-
ous impact. on a community's continued ability to control subdivision development.
Exactions are presently used to insure that land for necessary facilities such as sewers,
sidewalks and even parks will be available."' It is doubtful in this era of strained budgets
and tight finance that local governments could afford to pay for the land presently
acquired via exactions. 405 Nor is it unreasonable to speculate that if the Court was willing
to invalidate a rental property regulation on the basis that it authorized a permanent
physical occupation of private property, it would also be willing to invalidate a subdivision
property regulation on the same basis.
Instead of establishing a per se rule with the potential power to invalidate subdivision
exactions, the Court in Loretto should have borrowed the lower courts' rationale for
upholding subdivision exactions. Just as the subdivider is faced with a choice between not
subdividing or voluntarily complying with all applicable exactions regardless of whether
they require a permanent physical donation of land, the apartment building owner
should be faced with a choice between not using his property as an apartment building or
complying with all applicable rental property regulations. Like the subdivider, the apart-
ment building owner is engaged in a profit making enterprise. He is not defending hearth
and home against a governmental intrusion, but simply attempting to maximize the profit
potential of his property. As applied to him, section 828 is merely another regulation
governing his business. Subdivision exactions have been upheld as valid business regula-
tions designed to protect the public regardless of their required permanent physical
donation of land:1 " Section 828 and similar rental property regulations could also be
upheld on that basis. Logic requires that the alternative is to invalidate both subdivision
exactions and rental property regulations which require any permanent physical occupa-
tion of private property by the public. Precedent demonstrates, however, that the lower
courts have been unwilling to invalidate useful exactions if they are related to a need
created by the subdivider and necessary to promote the public wellare. 917
In Loretto, the New York Court of Appeals found that section 828 was both reason-
able and necessary to promote the public wellare.4" The invasion authorized by the
statute was minimal in nature and did not interfere with any reasonable expectation that
the space occupied by the cable would be income productive: 4 ° 9
 In addition, the statute
even provided for the protection of the landlord's interests by requiring the cable
4" Loretto, 458 U.S. at 426.
462 U
4°S
	 at 439. "We fail to see ... why a physical occupation of one type of properly but not
another type is any less a physical occuption." Id.
404 See supra notes 346-50 and accompanying text.
11° For a comprehensive discussion of the budgetary effects of subdivision exactions, see
Heyman and Gilhool, The Constitutionality q• Imposing Increased Community Costs on New Suburban
Residents Through Subdivision Exactions, 73 YALE L.J. 1119 (1964).
" See supra notes 374-84 and accompanying text.
' See supra notes 367-71 and accompanying text.
4"m Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 53 N.Y.241 124, 143-44, 440 N.Y.S.2d 843,
852-53, 423 N.E.2d 320, 329.30 (1981).
409 Id. at 154.55, 440 N.Y.S.2d at 848-59, 423 N.E.2d at 336.
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television company to pay for the installation, maintenance and removal of the equip-
ment, and to indemnify the landlord for any damages caused by the equipment. 410
Moreover, the New York Legislature had determined that section 828 insured that
landlords would not selfishly impede the spread of an important means of public com-
munication and education."" The legislators had discovered that landlords often charged
tenants who subscribed to the service a higher monthly rent or charged the cable
television company a higher fee for the use of the landlord's property,'" The legislature
had feared that these fees would inhibit the development of cable television, a service
which, in their estimation," 3 benefitted the general welfare. Given those factors, it would
have been reasonable for the Supreme Court to conclude that section 828 was a valid and
carefully planned regulation designed to protect the public interest in the spread of cable
television, from price-gouging landlords, while at the same time, limiting as much as
possible the interference with the landlord's property rights. The lower courts have
already determined that subdivision exactions similarly protect communities from
deficient subdivision developments, through a limited and valid interference with the
developer's property rights and profit potential. 41 ' Yet subdivision exactions, like section
828, require a permanent physical occupation of property. Either the pence rule in Loretto
may mandate the invalidation of subdivision exaction, or in retrospect, the Loretto Court
should have considered the rationale supporting exactions to uphold section 828 as a
valid police power measure to protect the public welfare.
CONCLUSION
Loretto's per se rule that all permanent physical occupations of private property
authorized by government are takings, contradicts the recent trend toward the develop-
ment of a multifactor balancing- test suitable for all takings disputes. The per se rule lacks
the flexibility inherent in the balancing test and essential for the resolution of modern
disputes arising out of the complex urban and technological environment of the twentieth
century. In a changing world, old concepts of private property and public interest should
also change. The Loretto Court has attempted to halt that necessary evolution with its old
fashioned, overly simplistic and rigid rule. Such a rule not only seems unsuited to the
modern age, but may also have a far-reaching and disastrous impact on important
regulations such as subdivision exactions.
VALERIE WELCI
See supra note 32.
4" Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 53 N.Y.2d 124, 141, 440 N.Y.S.2d 843,
851, 423 N.E.2.d. 320, 328 (1981).
412 Id. at 143-44, 440 N.Y.S.2d at 852-53, 423 N.E.2d at 329-30.
4 " Id.
1 " See supra notes 388-99 and accompanying text.
